VISIT…



THE 1971 HONINBO TOURNAMENT

by Kaoru Iwamoto, 9-dan

THE ISHI PRESS GO SERIES



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Ishida (left) and Rin survey the board at the end of the 6th and last game.
By winning this game Ishida became the 26th Honinbo.

THE 1971 HONINBO TOURNAMENT

by Iwamoto Kaoru, 9-dan

in collaboration with

James C. Davies

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

This book describes the capture of the Honinbo title by Yoshio Ishida, which was round one of his rivalry with Rin Kaiho, a rivalry that was to dominate the first half of the 1970's. In that sense, it records the opening of a new chapter in the annals of go.

When it was written in 1971, there was no telling how long Ishida would remain Honinbo. There still isn't—he defended his title through four consective years from 1972 to 1975 and is now awaiting his challenger for 1976. His opponents and scores in the Honinbo title matches so far have been as follows:

1971	Ishida	4	—	2	Rin
1972	Ishida	4	—	3	Rin
1973	Ishida	4	—	0	Rin
1974	Ishida	4	—	3	Takemiya
1975	Ishida	4	—	3	Sakata

Thus he has fought Rin for the Honinbo title three times. These two have also fought three other matches for two other titles, the Meijin and Oza:

1973	Meijin Sen	Rin	4	—	3	Ishida
1974	Meijin Sen	Ishida	4	—	3	Rin
1974	Oza Sen	Ihsida?	2	—	1	Rin

In all they have met six times in the space of about three-and-a-half years. Ishida has forced Rin to yield both of the major titles, Honinbo and Meijin, and taken a third title from him as well, but the story is undoubtedly not finished yet.

The labor of writing this book was divided among several people. The routine analysis and the writing up of the text fell to me. The deeper comments, including most of the explanatory diagrams, were supplied by Kaoru Iwamoto, 9-dan, and three of his professional pupils: Reiki Magari, 9-dan; Masaaki Fukui, 7-dan; and Hitoshi Noguchi, 5-dan. I also drew upon the accounts of the games published in various go magazines. The original idea for doing this book came from Richard Bozulich of the Ishi Press.

Fourteen games are presented with analyses, and although three or four are treated rather lightly, the rest are gone over in greater than usual detail. We are trying to make it possible for those who want to study the games to do so in a useful way, and for even the casual reader to appreciate how much thought goes into a professional game. If playing through them while reading the commentaries widens your grasp of go, sharpens your awareness of its detailed structure, and makes you a little stronger, our main purpose will be accomplished.

Tokyo, January 1976

James Davies

CHAPTER 1: Ishida-Oeda

Late in the evening of June 11, 1971, two young men were sitting on the tatami mat floor of the Ginrin So in Otaru. Between them was a go board, almost half covered with black and white stones. For two days, for nearly 20 hours, they had been concentrating their powers onto this wooden battlefield. The 26th Honinbo title was at stake.

The older of the two was Rin Kai Ho, thrice Honinbo and generally considered the strongest go player in the world. He was playing black, and after a successful attack in the middle game he seemed to be leading by about ten points. His opponent was Ishida Yoshio, twenty-two years old and already owner of the Nihon Kiin Championship title. This was the fifth game of the Honinbo match, each player having won two of the previous four games.

The younger man picked up a white stone and placed it on the board. At the same time the scorekeeper announced, "Ten minutes, Rin sensei, before you enter byo yomi." Rin had used up 9 hours and 49 minutes of his allotted 10 hours, and in ten minutes he would be held to one minute per move. White's last play was a strange one, apparently causing White to lose another point or two. It threatened to break into Rin's large territory on the right side, but he could easily defend against that. Did it perhaps threaten his weak center group, too? Rin settled down to think. "Nine minutes," the scorekeeper announced, and then, "Eight minutes." Rin took a black stone and made his move. It was a mistake. Forty-one moves later his center group was cut adrift, helpless. Another twenty-six moves and he gave up. Twelve days later Ishida defeated him again, by half a point, to become the youngest Honinbo in history and the sensation of the go world.

Ishida Yoshio, who is the main character of this book, was born on August 15, 1948, in Nishiharu, a small city on the outskirts of Nagoya. His father made him learn go at the age of eight, trying to keep the boy out of mischief on rainy days. He must have shown some talent, for at the age of nine he was sent to live in the Kitani Dojo in Tokyo.

Kitani Minoru was, in his day, one of the top go players in Japan. Now he is retired, but the fame of his go school, the Kitani Dojo, continues to grow. Kitani's pupils study go with fanatical devotion, and the combined strength of those who have reached the professional level adds up to more than two hundred dan. Many

of them live in the dojo and treat Kitani as their father. In this hothouse of go the young Ishida made rapid progress, and in 1963 he became shodan and began to play in the professional tournaments. His success in the Oteai games, which determine a player's ranking, was remarkable. He was promoted almost as rapidly as the rules of Oteai allow, which is about one dan per year. Going into the Honinbo title match he had a thirty game winning streak in Oteai, and had reached 7-dan. He was promoted from 6 to 7-dan even faster than the rules officially allow. Normally a player is required to achieve a 75% score over a stretch of eighteen consecutive games, but Ishida was promoted after only fourteen games. He had won them all, and he pointed out to the Nihon Kiin that even if he lost his next four games, he would still qualify for 7-dan.

In 1968 Ishida won the Kodansha tournament, a competition among 5 to 7-dan players. Next year, to everyone's surprise, he became the challenger in the Nihon Kiin Championship match and took the title away from Ohira, 9-dan, who had held it for four straight years. At twenty-one he was the youngest player ever to win a major go tournament. The Honinbo title was to come next.

The name Honinbo originally belonged to one of the four go schools which were established in 1612 by the Tokugawa government of Japan. For more than three centuries the name was handed down by the head of this school to his strongest pupil until in 1939 Shusai, the 21st Honinbo, retired and gave his title to the Nihon Kiin, the fifteen year old organization that had established itself on top of the go world. It was his desire that the Nihon Kiin award the title on the basis of a regularly held tournament. The Mainichi Newspaper took on sponsorship of this tournament and the first new Honinbo was crowned in 1941.

This is the place to describe the organization of the Honinbo tournament, or Honinbo Sen. Each year the current Honinbo must defend his title in a seven game title match. The challenger is selected by a round robin tournament among eight players known as the Honinbo League. Of these eight players, four are the top four finishers in the previous year's league and the other four are selected by an elaborate preliminary tournament. The preliminary tournament, which is open to all professional go players in Japan, is conducted in three rounds on a strict elimination basis. The first round is for players from shodan to 4-dan. Six survivors join the second round, along with all players 5-dan and above who care to enter. Sixteen players survive the second round to enter the third round, where they are joined by the sixteen players who won their first games in the last year's third round. These thirty-two compete for the four open places in the Honinbo League.

The Mainichi Newspaper pays a fee to every player for each game he plays in the Honinbo tournament. The game fees are small in the early rounds, but are large in the Honinbo League and the title match, and in addition there is a prize of 3 million yen for the title winner. Thus the Mainichi Newspaper took on quite a burden when it agreed to sponsor the tournament, but it prints serialized records of the games with commentaries, and in a country where go is taken as seriously as it is in Japan this helps its circulation considerably.

Ishida's progress towards the 26th Honinbo title began in May, 1970, almost a year before the title match itself. Being then a 6-dan, he came in at the second round of the preliminary tournament and had to win six straight games to reach the Honinbo League. He defeated, in order: Tanimiya, 6-dan; Suzuki, 7-dan; Ishigure, 7-dan; Isogawa, 7-dan; Kitani, 6-dan, (the daughter of Kitani Minoru); and Oeda, 7-dan. The reader may be interested in seeing the last game of this series, which we herewith present.





Figure 1 (1–52)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1–52).

This game was played on November 12, 1970, at the old Nihon Kiin headquarters in Takanawa, Tokyo. The time limit was 6 hours per player and there was a 4½ point komi. Black was Ishida and White was Oeda.

In this game Ishida made use of a new joseki developed at the Kitani Dojo. We are referring to Black 11, which replaces the older play at 15. The kosumi-tsuke at White 12 is one way to deal with this new move, taking the corner and allowing Black the outside. Another way is to attack the two black stones on the right side with a move like White 1 in **Dia. 1.** We have borrowed that diagram from the 1970 Meijin sen.

The sequence in the lower right corner came to a reasonable conclusion with White 20, and Ishida proceeded to take territory along the lower and right sides while Oeda, who already had territory in two corners, built up a position in the center. White 42 and 44 in particular gave him a lot of power there, and perhaps Ishida should not have provoked these two moves. Attention now shifted to the upper side, where Ishida extended all the way to Black 45 and Oeda attacked purposefully with 46, 48, 50, and 52.

Figure 2 (53–78).

Ishida played tsuke-koshi at 53 to start fighting. White 54 and Black 55 followed of necessity, and now what? White would have liked to capture Black 53 by playing kakae at 1 in **Dia. 2.** This would allow Black to push through at 2 and 4, but White could resist at 5. Black cuts, but the White kaketsugi at 7 is sente. It appears that White has settled his stones on the upper side and can now continue to fight in the center.






Figure 2 (53–78)



Dia. 2


However the white stones are not settled. If White continues with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 3,** then Black 4 sends him scurrying along the upper edge to live, and this is the end of the attack on Black's center group. Therefore White had to play nobi at 56 in the figure and permit Black to play 57.




Dia. 3

Instead of White 60 there was the cross-cut tesuji shown in **Dia. 4,** but Oeda rejected it. After White 1, Black would secure a large corner in sente with 2 and 4, then play 6. It would not be hard for him to make sabaki in the center, especially since sabaki is one of Ishida's strong points. White 60 showed good judgement, but White's next move was a mistake.

Oeda suffered a big loss when he played 62. **Dia. 5** shows the correct way. White 1 to 9 in that diagram give the same kind of result as White 62 to 74 in the figure, but they are better by about 15 points, since the connection at 'a' is White's sente.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

So Ishida suddenly found himself with a sizeable lead as he played 75, taking the offensive in the center. Oeda decided that it would be fruitless to persist with 1 in **Dia. 6.** Black would play 2, White would have to protect with 3 and 5, and Black 6 would defend the center group. He played White 76, hoping for complications. Ishida played 77 to capture White's four stones, avoiding complications, and Oeda shifted his attack to the right side with 78.



Dia. 6





Figure 3 (79–117)



Dia. 7
⑨ takes ko
⑫ 〃 〃
⑮ 〃 〃

Figure 3 (79–117)

With the sequence from 79 to 102 White successfully broke up Black's territory on the right side and even forced him to play 103 to live there. Unfortunately, Black 103 also threatened the lower right corner and White could not afford to defend it. Black's territory already amounted to about 70 points. If White defended the corner he could get about 15 points there, and he could count on about 25 points in the upper left corner, but it would be impossible for him to get the 25 more points he would need if he permitted Black to play first on the left side.

So he defended that side with White 104 and Ishida skillfully wrecked the corner with 105 and the rest. The semeai there is a bit hard to read out, but after Black 117 it is ko, as shown in **Dia. 7.** Black had lots of good ko threats, starting with 'a' in figure 3, and Oeda, who was in time trouble, gave up.

Time elapsed: White: 5 hrs. 59 min.
Black: 3 hrs. 50 min.

CHAPTER 2: Kato-Ishida

Two weeks after Ishida's victory over Oeda the Honinbo League got under way. The participants were:

Sakata	9-dan
Kano	9-dan
Kato	6-dan
Fujisawa Hosai	9-dan
Fujisawa Shuko	9-dan
Hoshino	8-dan
Chino	7-dan
Ishida	7-dan

The first four on this list qualified as the top four finishers in the last year's league. The last four had to fight their ways up through the preliminary elimination rounds.

The 26th Honinbo League was conducted over a period of nearly five months at the rate of one or two games per week. All of the games were played at the old Nihon Kiin building in the south central Tokyo district of Takanawa. The playing conditions for all of them were the same and were as follows.

Each player had nine hours of clock time per game, and so every game lasted two days. Each game began at 9:30 a.m. on a Wednesday and continued, with a break for lunch, until about six o'clock. At that time the player whose turn it was to move would decide on his next play, then write his choice on a piece of paper to be sealed in an envelope. Next morning the envelope would be opened, the move played, and the game would continue.

The purpose of this sealed move system is to prevent the player who is to move first on the second day from using the evening of the first day as extra thinking time. In theory this is perfectly fair, but in practice it often helps the other player. By using for the sealed move some kikashi which must obviously be answered in one particular way, that player can use extra time overnight to make his own plans for the second move of the second day.

Play continues on the second day until the end of the game, which may come in the mid-afternoon or may come late at night. A player never runs out of time. When he has used up 8 hours and 59 minutes his clock is stopped, and thereafter

he is permitted one minute per move. He is then said to be in byo yomi, (second-reading), for the time-keeper counts off the seconds of each minute much as an astronaut counts down toward blast-off, a procedure not entirely conducive to collected thought. The time keeper, who is himself a young professional go player, also makes a record of the game.

Sente in the Honinbo League games is decided for each game by a pre-arranged schedule which ensures that each player has black in three or four of his seven games. There is a 4½ point komi in each game, that is 4½ points are deducted from Black's territory at the end of the game to compensate for his having moved first. This komi system also prevents jigo. If the Honinbo League ends with a tie for first place, there is a play-off to decide the Honinbo challenger.

The first two games of the 26th Honinbo League were played on November 25 and 26. One of them matched Fujisawa Hosai and Chino. The other, which is the subject for this chapter, matched Kato and Ishida.

Kato Masao, now 7-dan, was born in 1947 and is a year and a half older than Ishida. Like Ishida he is a pupil of Kitani. Ishida, Kato, and Takemiya, (6-dan, born in 1951), are known as the three crows of the Kitani Dojo. All of them are young, have done well in the professional go tournaments, and are expected to be among the top go players in the years to come.

Kato first achieved fame in 1967, when he was only a 4-dan, by battling all the way up from the first preliminary round to gain entry into the 23rd Honinbo League. That was remarkable enough, but next year he amazed the go world by tieing Fujisawa Shuko and Takagawa for first place, then winning the play-off and becoming the youngest Honinbo challenger ever. He was beaten 4–2 by Rin Kai Ho in the title match. His style of play is aggressive and large in scale. He is noted for his ability to trap and kill big groups of stones.





Figure 1 (1–9)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1–9).

Kato, who was scheduled to have black in this game, played the first stone at komoku in his opponent's lower left hand corner. The moves up to Black 7 were quite orthodox, but White 8 was unexpected. The usual thing would be for White to play 1 or 'a' in **Dia. 1**, after which he could attack at 'b' and Black could fight back with 'c'. When Ishida played 8 in the lower left corner Kato took the initiative in the lower right by playing taisha at 9.






Figure 2 (10–18)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (10–18).

White 10 and 14 are the usual way to handle the taisha in the presence of △ but White 18 was a surprise move. Kato was expecting White 1 in **Dia. 2.** The sequence there is a standard joseki in which White gets territory on the lower side but is left with four weak stones on the right side.

This was not the first time that White 18 had been played. Kato remembered seeing something like **Dia. 3** in a game between Kajiwara, 9-dan, and Otake. White 3 and 5 had led to a terrific fight. The value of White 1 is that it permits White to jump out as far as 'a' on the lower side, and also permits White 'b', Black 'c', and White 'd' in the corner.






Figure 3 (19–26)



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Figure 3 (19–26).


Kato decided that 19 was the vital point, and Ishida jumped out to 20. Kato was soon sorry for this exchange. Black 21 was necessary to keep White from playing 'a' in sente, but now Black had used too many plays to live in the corner and was in trouble on the outside.

White 22 and 24 were a good, quick way of playing. If Ishida had played 1 in **Dia. 4** Kato would have connected at 2. In this diagram Black can easily run with his three stones in the center and he has some good aji, (Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'), on the lower side. After White 24 Black could push through and take territory on the right side with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 5,** but then White would capture two stones on a large scale, gaining great power in the center. Dia. 5 is good for White, so Kato played kaketsugi at 25 in the figure and prepared for an uphill battle.


Ishida attacked with a boshi at White 26. This was a strong move, but after the game it was suggested that White 1 in **Dia. 6** would have been better. If Black played 2, White 3 and Black 4 would leave him with bad shape. If Black played as in **Dia. 7** he would get a reasonable shape, but White would get an even better one by capturing Black 1. Now Black's center stones would be subject to attack and White's would not. Finally there is **Dia. 8**. Black captures three stones, but White gets an outside wall.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (27–31).

Black 27 and 29 determined the course of the fighting to come. Three diagrams should suffice to explain what was going on here.

Instead of 27, Kato could have moved out with Black 1 in **Dia. 9**. White 2–8 would be the natural continuation, and although Black would have sente his center stones would have less eye shape than White's. Also the weak point at 'a' would be gone. Kato did not like this. He would have liked to move immediately toward White's weak point with 1 in **Dia. 10**, forcing White to connect at 2. Unfortunately, he could not continue fighting with 3 because after White 6, 'a' and 'b' would be miai.

Accordingly Kato first played kikashi at 27, then drove at White's weakness with 29 and 31. Ishida naturally played 30 and 32, and now what would have happened if Black had connected? **Dia. 11** shows the answer. This time Black gets a shicho. In the upper left corner, however, there was a white stone breaking the shicho.







Figure 4 (27–32)



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11





Figure 5 (33–44)


Figure 5 (33–44).

Therefore Black's next play was a shicho atari. At first glance it may seem that White should by all means ignore this play and capture with White 1 in **Dia. 12**, but then Black 2, (or 'a'), would be severe and Black would still be able to make some kind of shape in the center by playing 'b'. Ishida could do better than this.


After the game **Dia. 13** was suggested as the best way for White to play. With 1 and 3 he captures two stones on the right side, ('c' is his sente), and White 5 gives him a grand position. Of course Black 2 and 6 are big too, but they do not seem to compensate for what has happened on the other side of the board. Note that White has aji to live in ko with 'd'.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13




Dia. 14

No doubt the reader wonders why Black does not answer White 1 in Dia. 13. The reason is shown in **Dia. 14.** If Black plays 2, White can answer the shicho atari at 3 and then play 5–11, after which he can capture at either 'e' or 'f'. On the other hand, if White tries to play this sequence without first exchanging 1 for 2 he will fail, as **Dia. 15** shows.



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

But Ishida thought he could answer the shicho atari even without playing White 1 in Dia. 13 or 14. He had read out the sequence up to 44 in the figure, and he expected it to continue as in **Dia. 16.** Black 1, 3, 5, etc. there seem to be the only way for Black to salvage anything out of this position, but White captures five stones and has four more weak ones to pick up in due time. This result is quite good for White, but there was a surprise in store for him.

Figure 6 (45–56).

Kato upset his opponent's plans by playing Black 45. Now after 47 Ishida was unable to carry out the sequence of Dia. 16. If he had tried to do so by playing 1 in **Dia. 17**, Kato would have started a ko with 2. In this sequence White has no useful ko threats and Black comes out one play ahead, leaving White with two weak, divided, heavy groups on the right.

Fortunately Ishida had an alternative way to play, which was to cut at 48 He had to give up his stones on the right, but at least he got a good position in the center. He was not very happy with this result. He had missed some good opportunities, such as Dia. 13, because of his failure to foresee Black 45, but on the other hand Kato, in spite of his large profit on the right side, did not consider Black's position superior. The dead white stones still had some aji. For one thing, White could capture Black 45 in sente.

The reader, if he understands Dia. 17, should be curious as to why Black did not play that ko after White 54 instead of merely playing 55. In **Dia. 18** we see him doing so, and we also see what is wrong with it. White 18 is a rather damaging tesuji.






Figure 6 (45–56)



Dia. 17
❽ takes ko
⑪ 〃 〃
⓮ 〃 〃

Figure 7 (57–66).

Now that the fight in the lower right, which had been started by Kato's taisha play, (Black 9), and the unexpected White 18, was resolved, the players could begin to think about the rest of the board. Kato had sente and he began by playing kikashi at 57 and 59. Black 61 seemed a good point, (it threatened to release Black △), but White 62 was also good. Black might have followed **Dia. 19** instead. Black 1–7 are not joseki because of White's large corner territory, but in this game that territory would be balanced by Black's territory on the right side, while his five



Dia. 18
❼ takes ko
⑩ 〃 〃
⓭ 〃 〃





Figure 7 (57–66)

stone wall would surely earn him something on the upper side and would cancel White's power in the center.


At any rate, after White 62 Kato had to prevent his opponent from seizing a vast territory on the left side. He extended to 63, but Ishida confronted him at 64, still threatening to take a large territory. Kato invaded at 65 and was attacked by 66. After the game he said that he should have played 66 himself instead of 63. He could then have extended either to 63 or to 'b'.

There were several ways for Black to answer White 66. Kato chose 'b', but we shall digress to examine the other possibilities.


First there was the niken biraki, Black 1 in **Dia. 20**. This play is somewhat dubious. White can build a wall with 2, 4, 6, and 8, then start a really large-scale attack with 10.




Dia. 19



Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Black 1 in **Dia. 21** was the second possibility. After playing 1 and 3 Black can extend all the way to 5. This might actually have been the best way for him to play.

The third possibility was Black 1 in **Dia. 22**. If White plays 2 to keep Black from getting a base on the right side, Black can make a bamboo joint with 3 and 5, then jump out to 7 or 'a'. This way of playing is acceptable.





Figure 8 (67–80)



Dia. 23

Figure 8 (67–80).

Black 67, the move which Kato chose, was comparable to Black 1 in Dia. 22. Ishida played 68 and 70 to deprive the Black stones of room along the side and kept up the chase with White 72. Kato thought that 73 would be a good kikashi, but Ishida was happy to play 76 and 78, making a strong shape and starting to form territory in the center. After the game Kato said that he should simply have

played another ikken tobi, as in **Dia. 23**. If White then played 2, Black could turn on the three stones on the left side with 3. Even after White 78 Kato should have played 1 in Dia. 23, but instead he played 79 in the figure and Ishida attacked at once with 80.






Figure 9 (81–90)



Dia. 24




Dia. 25

Figure 9 (81–90).


For the second time in this game Kato was in big trouble. White 82 took a vital point, destroying his eye shape. Black 83 was a good counter move, threatening to connect with the lower left corner. Perhaps Ishida should have played 1 in **Dia. 24** instead of 82. Black could live easily then, but 3 and 5 would bring White a nice profit. Kato might have played less passively than Black in Dia. 24.

After 85 the black group was still in danger. Kato was afraid of White 1 in **Dia. 25**. Against this move he could only play 2 and hope that the worst would not come to pass, but Ishida had fancier ideas. He probed in the lower left corner with White 86. He felt that he could not capture Black's weak group, but depending on how Black answered 86, White 87 or 88 might become a good point, threatening both the corner and the group on the outside.

To avoid such a development Kato played 87 and 89. White 86 thus turned out to be gote, but Ishida was not dissatisfied because there remained terrible aji in the corner. By means of the sequence shown in **Dia. 26** White could take most of the territory there away from Black. In this sequence Black cannot switch 6 and 7. In **Dia. 27** he risks losing all his corner stones in a ko fight, as the reader can no doubt see for himself.



Dia. 26



Dia. 27






Figure 10 (91—100)

Figure 10 (91–100).


Black 93 was the vital point for defense, aiming at both Black 'c' and Black 'd'. If White played 1 in **Dia. 28**, for example, Black would play 2, moving into White's center territory. This exchange would serve no useful purpose for White, who would be burdened with three weak stones. White 94 in the figure was much better, protecting against 'c', but now Black 95 threatened 'd'. If White played 1 in **Dia. 29**, Black would play 2 and the cut at 3 would fail. After 10, Black threatens



Dia. 28



Dia. 29



Dia. 30

both 'e' and 'f'. If White continues as in **Dia. 30**, he will lose a large group on the upper side. The reader should be able to verify that Black is well ahead in this semeai.

Therefore Ishida played 96, defending against Black 'd'.






Figure 11 (101—116)

Figure 11 (101–116).


Kato now made shinogi with Black 1. Ishida could not play 1 in **Dia. 31** instead of 4 in the figure, for the black group would get away and reduce White's center territory to a shambles. If White 5 in Dia. 31 is replaced by White 1 in **Dia. 32** Black still can live. Black 10, threatening to play 'f' and capture the white stones, is the tesuji which does the trick. After 12 Black has a second eye in the center.




Dia. 31




Dia. 32



Dia. 33




Dia. 34
⑫connects



Dia. 35
⑪connects

Kato was correct in playing Black 5 immediately after White 4. If he had played 1 and 3 in **Dia. 33**, he would have been unable to play kikashi at 'g'. Black 9 was also correct. This play was not necessary for the life of the center group, but if it were omitted White could play 9 in sente, then attack at 'e'. The center fight came to an end with White 14, and Kato used his sente at 15, erasing the aji of Dia. 26. This took care of one corner, but Ishida invaded the other one at 16. The game was about even.

After the game Kato pointed out that he had missed a better way to make shinogi. Since he had to exchange 9 for 10, he should have done so earlier, playing as in **Dia. 34** and destroying White's center. If White played 1 in **Dia. 35** instead of 4 in Dia. 34, Black would fare even better. If instead of 5 in Dia. 35 White played 1 in **Dia. 36**, Black would fare better yet. If Kato had seen all this during the game, he would have won easily.



Dia. 36






Figure 12 (117–136)

Figure 12 (117–136).


White 18 and 20 were good technique. Ishida lived in the corner in sente and took the last large point with White 22. If he had played 1 in **Dia. 37** Kato would have jumped at the chance to play 2, forcing White to live in gote and getting to play 14. Ishida was perfectly willing to have Black play 1 in **Dia. 38**, for he had enough ko threats to win the ko fight and capture at 'a', which would leave him in a position to erase nearly all of Black's territory on the upper side.




Dia. 37



Dia. 38




Dia. 39




Dia. 40


Furthermore, if Black had played tenuki after White 20, White could have played 1 in **Dia. 39**. Black 2 would be useless because of White's superiority in ko threats. Black 1 in **Dia. 40** is impossible. Nor could Black get away with 1 and **3** in **Dia. 41**. Being behind in ko threats is a matter of no small importance. Black 3 in **Dia. 42** would be more prudent, but then there would be no stopping White from marching along the upper edge, eating up three points of black territory with every step. **Dia. 43** would be the best Black could do, but even if he made some territory with 'b' his loss would still be enormous.



Dia. 41



Dia. 42




Dia. 43


Instead of playing 30, Ishida should probably have gone back and answered Black 27 in the figure. The game might then have proceeded as in **Dia. 44**, and White would appear to be leading since he would be threatening to play 'a' and 'b'.


Black 35 in the figure was definitely the correct reply to White 34. If Black played 1 in **Dia. 45** White would follow with 2, 4, and 6, then make a kaketsugi at 8. This would leave seki aji in the corner, as in **Dia. 46.** If Black plays tenuki after 5 there mannen ko is also possible. If White tried to play Dia. 46 without playing △, Black could cut at 'c' and gain enough liberties to kill the corner. If Black plays 1 in **Dia. 47** instead of 7 in Dia. 45, however, White can live at once in the corner.

After White 36 there was ko aji in the corner, as shown in **Dia. 48.** This ko fight was worth 21 points, reducing Black's corner from 23 to 6 points while giving White 4 points of territory there, but at this stage of the game other things were more important.




Dia. 44


Dia. 45



Dia. 46


Dia. 47





Dia. 48


Figure 13 (137–150).

Black 37 was a huge point, worth far more than the ko in the lower left corner. White 40 was also big, though not as big as 37. This kosumi was only a small step forward, but see how it expanded White's center while Black's territory shrank away before it. Black 43 and White 44 were miai.

The reader may wonder about Black 45. This play left White the yose shown in **Dia. 49.** Would it not have been better for Black to have played 1 in **Dia. 50**? Black 3 and White 4 there would be the standard plays to assume for counting purposes, and the result is two points better for Black than Dia. 49. But Kato was right to play 45 as he did. He was thinking about White 1 in **Dia. 51.** Because of Black △ White 1 was now not so effective, and depending on the timing Black could ignore it or answer it at 2. In either case, White could not break through



Figure 13 (137–150)



Dia. 49


Dia. 50


on the right side. But if △ were as shown in **Dia. 52**, White 1 would become much more menacing. White 'a' would now cut off Black's corner stones, and if Black defended against 'a' White could later play 'b' to take a lot of center territory.

As soon as 45 was played and Ishida had no chance to break through on the right side, he played sente yose at 46 and 48. These two plays were important because Black had sente yose here too, as shown in **Dia. 53.** Black 1 combined with Black 'b', creating damezumari on the lower edge, would gain him seven points in sente. White could regain the seven points by playing 'a' and capturing three black stones, but only in gote.


Dia. 51



Dia. 52



Dia. 53





Figure 14 (151–165)

Figure 14 (151–165).

Kato erased the ko aji in the corner with 51 and Ishida replied at 52. Considering White 'f' Black's position on the upper side was a bit thin, and Kato decided that it was better to play 53, aiming to capture White △, than to push on at 54. White 52 and Black 55 can be thought of as miai, but 52 was larger. After the game Kato said that he should have played **Dia. 54** instead of Black 51.

Ishida could not break through the upper side, but after playing 56 and 58 he got the largest remaining yose point at 62. Kato played 65, choosing to reduce his opponent's territory rather than to defend his own. Both players could see that the game was close, and whoever won would probably win by half a point, or 1½ at the most. Ishida now had a hard decision to make—whether to defend his territory at 'g' or to go into Black's territory at 'h'.



Dia. 54





Figure 15 (166–181)


Figure 15 (166–181).

Ishida decided to play 66, and the sequence which followed up to 72 is not too hard to understand. The other choice is shown in **Dia. 55.** The reader might like to try to decide who would have won if White had played that way instead of playing 66.


Kato crept farther into White's territory at 75 and Ishida answered by playing 76, preventing the black yose shown in **Dia. 56.** For the reader's information Black cannot play 1 in **Dia. 57** because his left side group dies. White 76 was worth about 6 points in gote, and Black 79 was worth the same. With the playing of these two miai the large yose points were all gone, but still no one could tell who had the lead.



Dia. 55



Dia. 56



Dia. 57





Figure 16 (182–200)


Figure 16 (182–200).

White 82, provoking Black 83, looks like a bad move but it was not incorrect, being based on deep reading of some aji in the upper left corner. If Ishida had followed **Dia. 58** he could have taken profit with 5, capturing one black stone and preparing to get two more with 'a', but eventually he would have to play 17 in gote, and then Black would spring 1, 3, and 5 in **Dia. 59**, inflicting a two point loss on him in sente. If White plays 1 in **Dia. 60** instead of 6 in Dia. 59 he again suffers a loss, for he will have to play inside his own territory to kill the black stones in the corner. Instead of 5 in Dia. 58, White 5 in **Dia. 61** would be correct, but the rest of the yose would be straightforward and White would lose the game by half a point.


Does the reader see why Kato played 85 instead of 93? The reason is shown in **Dia. 62**, where 6 and 8 gain White two points in sente on the left side.




Dia. 58




Dia. 59



Dia. 60



Dia. 61
(47) connects



Dia. 62

Figure 17 (201–215).

Only small plays were left now. White 6 and 8 were worth two points and eliminated the aji of Dia. 59, but when Kato played 9 he knew that he had a half point lead.





Figure 17 (201–215)

Four points were at stake in the ko but Ishida read out that he could not win by connecting it instead of playing 10. We shall take the trouble to follow this out ourselves. Suppose that White connects at 3 in **Dia. 63,** after kikashi at 1. The remaining plays are all worth one point. Black has sente yose at 4, 6, and 8, and then plays gyaku yose somewhere, say at 10. White has sente yose at 11, 13, 15, and then plays gyaku yose somewhere too, say at 17. On the upper side Black can push at 18. One point is at stake at 19, 22, and 23, and White can let Black push further at 20 while taking two of these three, or he can play 20 himself and let Black get two of the three; there is no unique best way to play here. At any rate, the yose is quite simple. Let us count.

In case the reader does not know, the professional way of counting a territory is to count one point extra for every stone captured inside it, whether the stone is on or off the board. (In the case of a ko or other exchange of prisoners, the net difference in captives is counted.) So in Dia. 63 White has 22 points in the upper left, counting the stone captured at 3. He has 4 in the upper right and 47 in the center, where he has captured four stones, for a total of 73. Black has 23 in the lower left corner, 3 in the left center, (one prisoner), 11 on the upper side, and 41, (counting eight captured stones), on the right side. His total is 78 and after subtracting the $4\frac{1}{2}$ komi, he wins by half a point.

Ishida was aware of this, so he played 10 and let the ko begin.



Dia. 63

Figure 18 (216–269).

Ishida had gained one point by playing 10 and another by playing 12 in the last figure, but still he could not win. Kato could afford to give up two more points if he connected at 16, balancing a four point loss with a four point gain, or he could take two points in ko threats while White captured and connected at 'i'. Ishida's




Figure 18 (216–269)

⑲ ko ㉒ ko ㉕ ko ㉘ ko ㉛ ko ㉞ ko
㊲ 〃 ㊵ 〃 ㊸ 〃 ㊻ 〃 ㊾ 〃 ㊷ 〃
㊺ 〃 ㊽ 〃 ㊶ 〃 ㊹ 〃 ㊼ 〃
㊾ connects at ⑯

only hope was that Black would run out of ko threats, but in the end it was White who ran out, and the only effect of this long ko fight was to increase Black's margin of victory to $1\frac{1}{2}$ points. The final count was:

White		Black	
Upper left	24	Lower left	23
Upper right	4	Left side	5
Center	46	Upper side	11
	74	Right side	41
			80

We are counting one point for Black at 'i' and one at 16— this was the net result of the prisoners exchanged in the ko.

Looking back, we can find no mistake in the last 103 moves of this game, so the outcome was decided when Ishida played White 66 in Figure 15. Whether or not he could have won by playing Dia. 55 instead of White 66 is a question we are not going to answer. For one thing, such a question is too academic to be interesting. For another thing, we believe that Dia. 55 would lead to a half point victory but we are not certain whose victory it would be.

So Ishida got off to a bad start in the Honinbo League. He now expected Kato to go on and win first place, but Kato lost his next two games and the hopes of the Kitani Dojo contingent in the league were low.

Time elapsed: White: 8 hrs. 13 min.
Black: 8 hrs. 55 min.

CHAPTER 3: Hoshino-Ishida

Ishida's second opponent was Hoshino Toshi, a 52-year-old 8-dan player making his first appearance in the Honinbo League. Like Ishida, he had lost his first game, so the loser of this match would have little chance of becoming Honinbo challenger. This game was played on December 16 and 17.






Figure 1 (1–50)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1–50).

Once again Ishida had the white stones and once again he was confronted with a difficult variation of the taisha joseki. In this variation the nidan bane, (Black 23 and 25), is very telling, and White 20 is usually played at 24 to avoid it. After Black 35 the five white stones on the left side were in a tight spot. If White made a kaketsugi as in **Dia. 1**, he would be ambushed and defeated by Black 4. If he made a tsugi as in **Dia. 2**, Black would play tsuke at 2, forcing him to crawl along the second line to live. The course of action Ishida chose was similar to Dia. 2. The exchange of 36 for 37 deprived his stones of one liberty, but it created good cutting aji on the outside. Although this variation of the taisha joseki is generally considered to be unfavorable to White, since he had White 2 to crawl towards Ishida was willing to try it.

Figure 2 (51–100).

After pushing at 54, Ishida would have liked to cut as in **Dia. 3**, but in that diagram Black 2 and 4 capture all the white stones on the side. Hoshino expected White 79, but instead Ishida connected at 56, threatening to play 1 in Dia. 3. When Hoshino connected at 57, Ishida had sente and was able to nullify Black's central strength with 58, 60, and so on. Black 61 was necessary to prevent White 61, Black 'a', White 'b'.

Before playing Black 53, Hoshino should have played kikashi at 1 in **Dia. 4**. Then White would have had no choice but to follow the sequence shown there, at least as far as Black 19. White 20 is a big move but on the whole Dia. 4 is favorable to Black, who has sente.






Figure 2 (51–100)




Dia. 3




Dia. 4


By chasing White's center stones Black built a large territory in the upper right while White took the lower right corner. Black attacked the upper left corner with 89 and White responded by entering the upper right corner with 90 and 92. Black 93 was the safest way to answer this invasion. It allowed White to live easily, but Black could not hope to save all his territory by resorting to more forceful means; look at **diagrams 5, 6,** and **7** for example. After gaining the right to live with 90–97, Ishida changed his tactics and played 98 and 100. He was thinking of the upper left and right corners as miai.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

At the end of this figure, take note of the black group in the lower left corner. These stones may look dead, but if White tried to kill them Black would cut at 'c', then happily start a ko fight at 'd'. White would have to find very large ko threats because his own stones would be in danger. The safest way for White to attack is to play 'c' himself, to which Black would answer 'e'. After this exchange Black would need one move, 'x', to live and White would need three, 'x', 'y', and 'z', to kill, so the Black group would be 75 percent alive in ko.





Figure 3 (101—150)



Dia. 8

Figure 3 (101–150).

Black 5 and 7 took aim at Black 'f', so after 9 White had to play 10 to avoid being cut. The expected exchange of the upper left and right corners took place and the game entered the o-yose stage, with many large points remaining. Ishida found some subtle plays here. We might mention White 34, which guaranteed his sente on the lower side. It threatened White 'g', Black 'h', White 'i', while leaving

Black no way to menace the lower right corner. We might also mention White 36, which threatened the cutting sequence shown in **Dia. 8**. As this figure unfolded it was gradually becoming clear that White was ahead, and when Ishida played 50 there was no real chance left for Black.




Figure 4 (151—200)

Figure 4 (151–200).

White 50 was an excellent yose tesuji. By sacrificing this stone and two others Ishida succeeded in crawling far up the right edge in sente, also getting in a useful kikashi at 52. As he played out this figure, Ishida was completely confident of victory.

Figure 5 (201–222).

The game was now in the last stages of yose. Hoshino seemed to be waiting for his opponent to start the ko in the lower left corner, but Ishida had no intention of doing so. Indeed if we count the territory at the end of this figure, assuming the black group to be absolutely alive, we get:

White		Black	
Left side	10	Lower left	3
Center	11	Upper left	10
Lower left	10	Right side	39
Lower right	26		52
	57		

Including komi, Black was behind by 9½ points, and White had no need for additional profit from a big ko fight. Seeing this, Hoshino gazed long and sorrowfully at the go board, then gave up.




Figure 5 (201–222)

Time elapsed: White: 7 hrs.
Black: 8 hrs. 55 min.

CHAPTER 4: Sakata-Ishida

After defeating Hoshino, Ishida took time out from the Honinbo League to defend his Nihon Kiin Championship title against the challenge of Takemiya, 6-dan. He returned to action in the league on February 2, having beaten Takemiya 3–0. His opponent now was Sakata, former Honinbo and a brilliant player in the middle and end game. The year before, Sakata had won the Honinbo League, but had lost to Rin in the title match by a 0–4 score. In this year's league his record so far was 2–0.

This was the third time that Sakata and Ishida had been matched. In late 1969 they had met in the final game of the knockout tournament to decide who would challenge Ohira for the Nihon Kiin Championship and Ishida, holding the white stones, had won by 4½ points. A few months later they had met in the Professional Best Ten tournament and Ishida, again with white, had won by 5½ points.





Figure 1 (1–14)

Figure 1 (1–14).

Once again Ishida held white. Sakata played hoshi and kogeima shimari with 1, 3, and 5 and Ishida did likewise with 2, 4, and 6. White 6 could be played at 7 in which case Black would perhaps play 'a', indeed that is how one of Ishida's games against Ohira for the Nihon Kiin Championship had started. In the present game the board was divided into two gigantic moyo. With White 14 Ishida jumped into the midst of his opponent's domain and the middle game began.

This fuseki was similar to the one Ishida and Sakata had played in their previous game in the Best Ten tournament. We show that fuseki in **Dia. 1** so that the reader can compare it with Figure 1 and ponder the significance, if any, of the differences between the two.



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (15–30).

White 16 and 18 are a common sabaki combination, but Black 19 offers strong resistance. What follows after White 20 is not established joseki, but is up to the skill of the individual players. We shall examine the moves of this figure closely.

Instead of playing 20, White could worm his way into the corner by following **Dia. 2**, but that diagram is not so good for him. Black makes large, secure territories on both sides and White has to look after a one-eyed group.

White 22 appears loose, but clearly Black cannot play 1 in **Dia. 3**. White 2 and 4 spoil Black △, and there is left the bad aji of White 'a'.






Figure 2 (15–30)




Dia. 2
● connects




Dia. 3


Instead of Black 23, the kaketsugi at 1 in **Dia. 4** looks attractive, but White would be satisfied to jump out to 2, having good aji at 'a' and at 'b'. The aji at 'a' is explained in **Dia. 5**, where White sacrifices 1 and 3 in order to play degiri with 7 and 9. Black is hard put to find any good way of dealing with White 9. Note that he cannot answer White 1 with 2 in **Dia. 6** because then he will be in trouble when White plays 5. He would like to maintain his territory with 6, 12, and 14, but White 15 captures at least one stone. Black 23 in the figure was played to eliminate the aji of the last two diagrams.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5
● connects




Dia. 6


Black 25 looks timid, but it was actually aggressive. If Black played 1 in **Dia. 7** then Black 'c' would lose its effect. White would play 2, aiming to invade the left side, and if Black defended that side then White could begin to think about a tsuke at 'd'.

Perhaps Sakata should have reversed the order of Black 25 and 27, as in **Dia. 8**. He could then have begun to attack with 5 before White had a chance to play 'd'. This sequence looks better for Black than the actual game, although whether it really is or not is uncertain.


Instead of Black 27, Black 1 in **Dia. 9** would be too passive. It would not attack strongly and it would not even be a perfect watari, since there would still be the bad aji of White 'd'.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

But Black 29, which Sakata played, was also passive. Black 1 in **Dia. 10** would have been better. That diagram differs from the figure by the exchange of 1 for 2, and this exchange is good for Black, who can watari at 'e' in case of need. Maybe Sakata was worried about the cross-cut after Black 1, but there was nothing to fear. If White cross-cuts with 2 in **Dia. 11**, Black answers with 3. White 4 and 6 simply do not work. No doubt the reader can see that after Black 13, White is through. There are other variations which we leave the reader to explore, but they are not good for White either.

So Ishida was feeling pleased with his position as he connected at 30, but of course his stones were still vulnerable to attack.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Figure 3 (31–47).

Sakata took the offensive with the nozoki at 31. Ishida pushed out with 32 and 36, cut at 38, then calmly played tobi at 40, leaving White 38 behind for aji. We shall see this aji used on several future occasions, and even though White 38 was soon captured it was as valuable a stone as any that he played. Sakata continued to attack with 41 and 43, and Ishida replied with kikashi at 44 and 46. After Black 47 there were many ways for White to move: kosumi at 'b' or 'c', magari at 'd' or 'e', and hasami-tsuke at 'f', (which would become a sacrifice stone). We shall not attempt to say which was best. Ishida chose 'e'.





Figure 3 (31–47)



Dia. 12

After the game Sakata criticized Black 47. He said that nidan bane, as in **Dia. 12**, would have been better. This may be, but White could play kikashi at 2, then magari at 4, aiming at 'a', and we are unconvinced.





Figure 4 (48–70)


Figure 4 (48–70).

In answer to White 48 Sakata felt that he had to play 49 to keep up the attack. Maybe he should have played more lightly by jumping to 51 instead, for White 50 enabled Ishida to strike into the heart of the black group at 52. If you think White 52 could have been cut off, see **Dia. 13** where White captures three stones in the so-called crane's nest shape.

Instead of Black 63, Black 1 in **Dia. 14** should be considered, but if we begin to study that diagram we can understand Sakata's reasons for rejecting it. After White 2, if Black continues with 'a' he is just helping White to move out to 'b'. On the other hand if he plays elsewhere and White eventually plays 'a', answered by Black 'c', (Black 63 in the figure), then the exchange of 1 for 2 becomes bad for him. If White 'a' is answered by Black 'd' then White has kikashi at 'e' or 'f'. Worst of all, White may be able to wait and play 'd' himself instead of 'a', breaking into the left side. Still, Dia. 14 would have given Black sente.




Dia. 13



Dia. 14

In the actual game Ishida had sente and the first day's play ended with White 66 as the sealed move. Black had to answer this kikashi, so Ishida was able to do some planning ahead overnight and he came up with White 70. The game was now clearly going in his favor. Sakata could not cut with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 15** because then Ishida would do some cutting of his own with 4 and 6. After White 6 Black must lose at least one group of stones.



Dia. 15





Figure 5 (71—90)

Figure 5 (71–90).


So after playing 71 Sakata played tsuke at 73. Ishida played 74 to spoil Black's eye shape, but in fact this play was a mistake. Had he not made it he could have defended at 1 in **Dia. 16.** If Black should cut at 2 White could still play 3 and 5, for after White 9 Black must lose either his stones in the center or those on the upper side. After Black 75 this possibility disappeared, so Ishida had to connect at 76 and Sakata began to plow up the right side territory.

Black 83 was a necessary preliminary to Black 85. If Black had played 85 without it, then White 'g', preceded by the 86–87 exchange, would have left him in a fix. Ishida answered 83 at 84 in order to keep up the attack on the whole black group. He could see that his corner was in no great danger.


Sakata seemed to have gained some ground as he played 89, a skillful move, but White 90 made the corner alive and the big black group was still subject to attack. **Dia. 17** shows one way of attacking it and **Dia. 18** shows another. Whether or not these are killing attacks is a problem we leave to the reader, but even if they are not they would enable White to build territory in the lower right quarter of the board, and in Dia. 18 to capture five stones in the center.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

Figure 6 (91–106).

Sakata defended his group with Black 91, 93, and 95 while Ishida built a ninety point moyo with White 92, 94, and 96. These plays also provided safety for the white center group. Black might have played 1 in **Dia. 19** instead of 95, attacking the center group, but then White would have played 2, a move which Black did not want to provoke. Furthermore Black's big group would not be absolutely safe, for White could play 'a', followed by Black 'b' and White 'c', capturing one black stone. This would not only attack Black's eye shape but also make White strong, so that Black would not find it so easy to invade the white moyo. The tsunagi at 95 was a proper thick play, preparing to cut through the thin white wall and making one eye in the center. A second eye could be had at either 'h' or 'i', so Black's group was alive. Since 'h' and 'i' were miai White could play either of them in sente, but of course he left them for the present, waiting to see which of them would become more useful in the future.






Figure 6 (91—106)



Dia. 19

Now it was Sakata's turn to attack a kogeima shimari, just as Ishida had done in the upper left corner early in the game. Black 97–105 consumed more than half of the white moyo. This new black group was weak, but if White attacked it with 1 in **Dia. 20** it would almost surely live, especially considering Sakata's legendary skill in shinogi. The kind of hasty attack shown in Dia. 20 is repugnant to professional players, for when White plays 1 he has shot his bolt. Later he may wish he had shot a different bolt. White 106 showed good yosu-miru strategy. Ishida waited to see how things would develop before deciding how to attack.



Dia. 20





Figure 7 (107–125)


Figure 7 (107–125).

Sakata had no stomach to wait for an attack on his weak group so he played 7 and 9, definitely making room for two eyes. This gave Ishida the chance to play a second kakari in the lower left corner, and the sequence from White 10 to 20 followed a well known joseki. Sakata finished the joseki with Black 21, attempting to form a large territory, but Ishida played kikashi at 22 and entered that territory with 24. White 24 could not be cut off by Black 25, as you can see in **Dia. 21.**

Instead of Black 21, Sakata should have played 1 in **Dia. 22**. Then if White had tried to break directly into the black territory with 4 and 6 he would have been turned back by Black 5 and 7. Needless to say White would not play 4 and 6 but would use the potential of playing them by aiming at 'a' and other points, so Black's territory would not be absolutely secure, but at least White could not march right in from above.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Figure 8 (126–143).

After capturing one stone in sente Sakata defended at 31, but Ishida kept on coming with 32–42, making good use of the aji supplied by △. The result was ko, but since Black had various weak groups on the board White was ahead in ko threats.

Incidentally, Black 31 was the correct defense. If Black had played 1 in **Dia. 23** then White would have pushed at 2, cut at 4, captured six stones in the center with 6 and 8, and won the game. For a similar reason Black could not play 41 at 42, letting White connect at 41. In Dia. 23 Black 5 is made necessary by the continually annoying presence of White △, as we trust the reader can see.






Figure 8 (126–143)



Dia. 23



Dia. 24

After Black 43 it appears to us that Ishida could have connected the ko as in **Dia. 24.** In that diagram we think that Black's only chance to win the game is to cut with 2 and 4, starting a fairly large semeai, but after White 13 he may as well call it quits. He may be able to make ko in the lower left corner, but he is too many moves behind in the semeai for that to be of any avail. Still, Sakata is at his best in a hard fight and there may be some things we are overlooking in this diagram. For one reason or another, Ishida rejected it.





Figure 9 (144—166)
60 **takes ko**
65 〃 〃

Figure 9 (144–166).

Taking no chances, Ishida connected at 44. Before making life with 51 Sakata played some kikashi on the other side of the board, giving White a chance to attack, but Ishida was not to be tempted into a fight. He could see that he was ahead and he wanted to avoid trouble. He continued his policy of non-aggression with 52, and Sakata started the ko with 57. White 61 threatened to make double ko, and instead of preventing this Ishida connected at 62, making thickness. With Black 65 Sakata regained his territory, but with White 66 Ishida kept the lead.

At the end of this figure 'j' had become an important yose point. White could play there in sente, capturing two stones and gaining eight points. If Black played gyaku yose at 'j', or better yet one point above 'j', his territory on the left would become 51 points. We are assuming that the double ko would eventually be reversed so that each side would have lost the same number of stones there, and that Black would get three points in the space lying between White 54 and Black 61. As we shall see, four points are all he could expect on the lower side, but with his territory in the upper right his total would come to something like 61. White would have about forty points in the lower right, seven in the lower left, seven or thirteen on the upper side, and maybe a few more in the center. This adds up to 54 or 60 or so, and the game would be rather close. Yet Ishida was confident of winning. The reason for his confidence was that White 66 threatened the big black group on the upper right again. If Sakata used his next play in the lower left corner, then the sequence shown in **Dia. 25** would take place. White 1, 3, 5 and 7 in that diagram make it impossible for Black to get two eyes. Because of Black 6 the corner would become ko, but Black simply could not afford to lose his large group. White had a good many ko threats against the group on the lower side, and if he traded his upper right corner for it he would win the game by twenty points.



Dia. 25

Figure 10 (167–201).

Sakata was running short of time, and Ishida was playing quickly and surely now. Black 67 and 69 prevented the death of the big group, but in gote. The rest of the plays in this figure were White's sente and they clinched the game. Black's territory totaled 57 points: 44 on the left side, where 97 had lost him one point, 4 on the lower side, and 9 on the right side. White could count on 59 points: 36 on the right side, 11 in the lower left, and 12 on the upper side, where he would make his next play. Considering komi, the ko on the upper side, and the fact that White stood to make more additional territory in the center than Black, the game was his by a large margin.

Since Black had no chance at the end of this figure, we can say that 67 was his last opportunity. If he had used this play at 87, risking the ko-fight in Dia. 25, he might have been able to come up with something.




Figure 10 (167—201)

(80) takes two stones (200) connects ko
(81) retakes (201) 〃 〃

Figure 11 (202–252).

The game was already decided, but Sakata does not like to resign, so he played it out to the bitter end. Ishida had won by $9\frac{1}{2}$ points, the final count being:

White		Black	
Right side	36	Left side	47
Upper right	12	Right side	8
Center group	4	Lower side	3
Lower left	11		58
	63		




Figure 11 (202—252)

(52) connects ko

Time elapsed: White: 7 hrs. 12 min.
Black: 8 hrs. 59 min.

CHAPTER 5: Hosai-Ishida

At the end of February the Honinbo League stood thus:

Fujisawa Hosai	4–0
Kato	4–2
Ishida	2–1
Sakata	2–2
Fujisawa Shuko	2–2
Hoshino	2–3
Kano	1–4
Chino	1–4

Fujisawa Hosai was well out in front with four straight victories, and the first game to be played in March matched him against Ishida. If Fujisawa won this game he would be virtually assured of winning the league, while if Ishida won he would become the player with the best chance of catching the veteran Fujisawa.

Fujisawa Hosai was born on March 5, 1919, and his game with Ishida was played on the two days before his 52nd birthday. He became 9-dan in 1949, being the first go player to earn that rank through the Oteai system. He has often played in the Honinbo League, and in 1957 he was Honinbo challenger to Takagawa. His challenge was unsuccessful, but he has won various other tournaments, most notably the Judan Sen in 1965.

Fujisawa has his own ideas about how to play go. When he has black he usually begins with the 1, 3, and 5 seen in this game, a pattern which no other player has seen fit to copy. With white he usually begins by playing mane-go. He thinks long and hard in the early stages of the game and enjoys large-scale life and death struggles.

Figure 1 (1–8).

After Fujisawa's standard opening Ishida made an ogeima shimari at White 6. This shimari is popular at the Kitani Dojo. Fujisawa played a kakari at 7, against which Ishida made a long range hasami at 8. White 1 in **Dia. 1** is nowadays the standard response to a kakari, but then Black would play 2, making an excellent extension in front of his shimari. We cannot actually prove that this is bad for White, but he would have played all of his first four stones on the right side, yet that side would still be wide open to a black invasion. In the fourteen games in this book the diligent reader will find twenty-one hoshi plays in the corners, nine kogeima kakari played against them, and not one instance of the "standard" ikken tobi response.






Figure 1 (1–8)

The reader might be nervous about playing such a distant hasami as White 8, but Ishida had his reasons. If he had played one point closer, the development in **Dia. 2** would have taken place. There Black takes the corner with 2–10, then gets to make a good extension from his shimari at 12. After White 11, White would like to see 1, and therefore 12, moved back one point to the left to give him more territory and Black less.


When Ishida played White 8 he expected the 3–3 point invasion because that is Fujisawa's style, but Black 1 in **Dia. 3** would not have been unwelcome. In that diagram White plays kikashi at 2 then ikken tobi at 4, after which Black 5 and White 6 are to be expected. Although White's two stones can be attacked, so can the three black stones to their right, and this looks better for White than Dia. 1, where he had no good invasion point on the upper side.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (9–21).

As expected, Fujisawa went in to the 3–3 point and the standard joseki from 10 to 18 followed. Next, after half an hour's thought, Fujisawa played 19. If Ishida had played White 20 in some other part of the board, then Fujisawa would have extended right up against the weak ogeima shimari with Black 1 in **Dia. 4**, threatening another 3–3 point invasion and other things. White could defend at 2, but then Black would build himself up nicely with 3, 5, and 7, a sequence which has appeared in several recent professional games.

Because of the weakness of the ogeima shimari we are sometimes advised to play White 'a' instead of White 20. Admittedly White 20 almost begged for an invasion at 'b', but that does not mean that it was a bad play. For one thing, White 20 built toward a larger territory than White 'a'. For another thing, Ishida had prepared an answer to Black 'b'.

Fujisawa thought for another half hour before playing 21. This play made a double wing extension from his san-san stone, but there is a weakness in such formations which every experienced player knows. No doubt the reader can anticipate White's next play.




Figure 2 (9–21)

Dia. 4

Figure 3 (22–35).

White 22 struck at the heart of Black's double wing formation, reducing it severely. Fujisawa pressed with 23 as called for by joseki, then again with 25, and then yet again. It seemed that he was going to keep right on going, but if he had played 1 in **Dia. 5**, White 2 would have been unbearable. In the absence of White △, however, Black 1 would be good.

White 30, preventing Black 1 in Dia. 5, was a big play. If Black now attacked with 1 in **Dia. 6**, White could make shinogi by cross-cutting with 2 and 4. After






Figure 3 (22–35)




Dia. 5

this cross-cut, if Black played 5 in **Dia. 7** White could make a good fight of it as shown. Instead of Dia. 7, Black would do better to follow **Dia. 8**, but this too would be all right for White. After White 8 in Dia. 8 if Black plays 'a' White can play 'b', forcing Black 'c', and then play 'd'.


So Fujisawa, after playing kikashi with 31, made a tobi on the second line at 33. This is what he was aiming at when he played 25 and 27. Ishida defended his stones at 34 and Fujisawa invaded at 35. This signalled the beginning of a lengthy running fight, the kind of go that Fujisawa likes.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8






Figure 4 (36–46)



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Figure 4 (36–46).


Ishida was ready and waiting with White 36 and 38. Although these plays are very reasonable, they are not part of the go players' standard repertory. The chase was on, and Fujisawa first ran one group out into the open with 41 and 43, then made a watari at 45 to protect the other one. The moves of this figure all appear natural, but the exact placing of each stone was a matter of great difficulty and importance. We shall examine White 46 to give the reader an idea of the considerations involved.

We shall start by considering White 1 in **Dia. 9** as an alternative to White 46. We can quickly reject it, since it serves chiefly to help Black to move out at 2. The ko at 'e' is not worth much, because White would be risking a great loss in the ko fight.


White 1 in **Dia. 10** is also bad. The territory White gets on the right side is not enough to compensate for Black 6, which suddenly puts Black in control of the center. Remember that White has another weak group in the lower left corner.



Dia. 11




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

White 1 in **Dia. 11** makes the most interesting study. Black 2 and White 3 appear to be fair and square, but there is more to this diagram than meets the eye at first glance. Next Black can play the sequence shown in **Dia. 12**, making one eye for his group in sente. Eye shape is of the greatest importance in running fights. Note that White must play 2 in Dia. 12, 2 in **Dia. 13** being absolutely impossible. If he wants to keep Black from making an eye, he has to play 1 in **Dia. 14**. After Black connects at 2 'f' becomes the vital point, so White will play there and Black will get away by running out to 'g' This is not so terrible, but White would like to be able to play nozoki at 'h' instead of at 1. In **Dia. 15**, where White △ is correctly placed, White can play nozoki from the left at 2, then attack viciously with 4, so Black cannot run so easily with the ikken tobi at 1.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15






Figure 5 (47–60)

Figure 5 (47–60).


White 48 was the sealed move ending the first day. The fighting was difficult and both players were taking their time, especially Fujisawa. Next morning he was ready with 49 and 51, but he was soon playing slowly again. Incidentally, he could have played 1 and so on in **Dia. 16** instead of 51. Perhaps this would have been better than the figure, we cannot say for sure, but at any rate he had to avoid Dia. 15.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17




Dia. 18


White 52 was now the vital point. If White had played 1 in **Dia. 17**, Black would have been glad to play the vital point himself, moving smoothly toward Black △. There was another meaning in White 52. If Black had answered with the ikken tobi at 1 in **Dia. 18**, then White could have played a sacrifice tesuji at 2 and cut right throught Black's line. Hence Black 53 in the figure.

We have more to say about Black 53. What about Black 1 in **Dia. 19** instead? The thing to notice here is that White could play 2 and the black stones would have poor eye shape. In **Dia. 20** by contrast, where Black 1 is the move Fujisawa played, Black can make good eye shape with the tsuke at 3, and 'i' becomes a good point for him too. Now you can see why Ishida played 54 in the figure instead of 2 in Dia. 20.


Following 54 Fujisawa had a chance to play 1 in **Dia. 21** and get his weak group to temporary safety, but he was determined to make life hard for his opponent so he played 55 in the figure to separate the two white groups. Ishida was immediately back on the offensive with White 56, ruining Black's eye shape. He had no fear of the cut shown in **Dia.** 22, which would leave Black with more worries than White. Fujisawa had to run out to 57, and after a kikashi at 58 Ishida played 60 to establish at least a loose connection between his groups.




Dia. 19



Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Figure 6 (61–70).

Fujisawa played kikashi at 61, then tobi at 63. Black 63 was the first play in a long time that had anything directly to do with making territory, and of course it also threatened to cut. If he could get a large territory in the upper left and avoid the loss of his big weak group Fujisawa would have an easy win, but things began to happen to his connection on the lower edge when White played 64 and 68. We shall spend some time reading out the possibilities there.

In the figure it looks as if Black is in some danger, so the reader may wonder why Fujisawa did not answer White 64 with 1 in **Dia. 23**. Then there would be no doubt about the connection, but White could make an eye in sente with 2, 4, 6, and 8. White 4 would also leave a little bad aji in Black's corner. If White happened to play △ in **Dia. 24** in the future, he could play 1–7 in that diagram in sente. In short, Black 1 in Dia. 23 would make it too easy for White to get eye shape.







Figure 6 (61–70)




Dia. 23



Dia. 24




Dia. 25




Dia. 26

Black 69 was an excellent tesuji. Black 1 in **Dia. 25**, which may look like a tesuji, was quite impossible, allowing White to capture three or five stones. The meaning of Black 69 can be partly seen in **Dia. 26.** White 1 there is obviously feeble. It would be more useful for White to play at 2 instead, threatening 1. White 1 and 3 in **Dia. 27** are less feeble, but by sacrificing a stone at 4 Black could connect his center stones to the group on the right. It begins to look as if Black was in no danger after all, but White 7 in Dia. 27 is a mistake. White should play 7 in **Dia. 28**, and then he could cut with 9. There was indeed bad aji here for Black, but before Ishida could exploit it he had to defend his own stones on the left by playing White 70.



Dia. 27



Dia. 28

Figure 7 (71–80).

If the reader understood the implications of Dia. 28, then he will understand why Fujisawa had to get moving with Black 71. Ishida simultaneously defended his territory and attacked with White 72. Black 73, 75, 77, and 79 were all good kikashi, but before answering the last of these Ishida played a kikashi of his own at 80. Fujisawa could not afford to cut with 1 in **Dia. 29** because his whole center group was in jeopardy. White 4 in Dia. 29 threatens to capture the six black stones on the lower side, as the reader will recall from Dia. 27, but if Black defends them with 5 then White 6 and 8 trap the center group. Black's struggles to escape with 9 and the rest only end in wretched failure.






Figure 7 (71–80)


To be kikashi a stone must have some effect other than just making a threat which must be answered. White 80, in addition to threatening the center group, anticipated the large yose play shown in **Dia. 30.** If, however, White should fail to get the opportunity to make that play then there was danger that White 80 would become a wasted stone, neither creating white territory nor destroying black territory.




Dia. 29



Dia. 30





Dia. 31


Figure 8 (81—89)

Figure 8 (81–89).


Black 81–89 were the measures Fujisawa took to rescue his threatened group The reader should see a close relation between these plays and the ones we discussed in diagrams 25–28. They prevented White from playing 2 in Dia. 25 to join his center stones to the right hand corner and established a connection for the black stones.

Ishida had no trouble deciding on White 84. Had he played 1 in **Dia. 31** instead, then Black 2 would remove the threat of White 'j', 'k' would be sente yose for Black, the center group would escape with 4, White would have to deal with 'm', and nothing would be accomplished.


The reader may be excused for wondering if Black's center group was really safe after 89. Would not White 1 and 3 in **Dia. 32** kill it just as they had in Dia. 29? With △ present in Dia. 32, Black could now survive with 4 and 6. Can the reader see what happens after Black 6?




Dia. 32



Dia. 33




Dia. 34




Dia. 35

If White plays 7 in **Dia. 33**, Black captures three white stones in the sequence up to Black 14. If White plays 7 in **Dia. 34** and persists with 9, 11, and 13 he suffers a huge loss, for by throwing in a stone at 26 Black wins the semeai by one play. White 3 in **Dia. 35** is another idea that fails. For completeness' sake we show White 1, 3, and 5 in **Dia. 36**, (to replace 1 and 3 in Dia. 32), which also fail. White 7 in **Dia. 37** is an alternative to 7 in Dia. 36, and it fails too. We are showing all these diagrams not so that the reader will learn them by heart, but so that he will appreciate the feats of analysis Fujisawa had to perform before playing Black 81–89.



Dia. 36



Dia. 37





Figure 9 (90–100)

Figure 9 (90–100).

Realizing that he could not kill the black monstrosity in the center, Ishida played 90, 92, 94, and 96 to defend his own stones. Black 97 threatened 1 and 3 in **Dia. 38**, so Ishida had to connect at 98 and Fujisawa was glad to play 99, finally making eye shape. Now Ishida still had Black 'm' to worry about. He defended aggressively with White 100. After Black 97 Fujisawa had used up 8 hours 59 minutes and was in byo yomi, but the quality of his play scarcely suffered, as we shall see.



Dia. 38





Figure 10 (101–113)

Figure 10 (101–113).

Fujisawa played 1, and Ishida finally had to connect at 2. After Black 7 **Dia. 39** was threatened, which would surely kill one of the two white groups. Ishida defended with White 8, which is the point 'n' in Dia. 39. Black 9 offered ko, (Black 'p'), at a time when White could not afford to accept and secured a connection to the left, White 'q' being answered by Black 'r'. We are puzzled by White 10, for Black 11 definitely gave the center group a second eye. Had Ishida kept the option of making a throw-in at 11 himself, he could still have attacked that group. Fujisawa was happy to get these side issues cleared up before proceeding with the main attack at 13.



Dia. 39





Figure 11 (114–135)
㉘ takes ko


Figure 11 (114–135).

White could not hope to win the game if he played 14 at 15, giving up his three stones, so his lower left group was cut off after all. It was just barely able to live. White 18 was sente, threatening **Dia. 40**, and Black 19 was the correct response. Fujisawa could not kill the white group by first playing 1 in **Dia. 41,** for then Ishida would have responded by skillfully sacrificing 6, 8, and 10 to make a second eye on the left edge. Black could not play the ko shown in **Dia. 42,** (instead of 9 in Dia. 41), because he would be risking his whole corner and would have no ko threats adequate to make up for such a big loss.


In the figure Black got 13 points in the lower left corner and White got 2. In Dia. 41 Black has 13 and White has 4, so Fujisawa did well to avoid it. The reader may wonder why Ishida did not play White 6, 8, etc. in Dia. 41 instead of White 22, leading to a result identical with Dia. 41 except for the absence of Black 1



Dia. 40



Dia. 41



Dia. 42

and White 2. Black's territory would then be 13 or 18 points, (18 if he later played 2), and White's would be 5 points, so White would be either 3 points better off or 2 points worse off than in the figure. It seems that Ishida missed a slight profit here, but in fact his play was correct. The figure left him many more ko threats than Dia. 41.

So far two weak groups, one black and one white, had become settled. Fujisawa turned to attack the last remaining one with 35.






Figure 12 (136–146)



Dia. 43



Dia. 44


Figure 12 (136–146).


Ishida could have played 's' to live, but first he came barging into Black's territory with 36–42 to see what he could do. If he could make room for a second eye there in sente, then he would not have to play 's' but could take the big yose point at 't' instead. Please refer back to Dia. 30. When he played 46 he seemed to have achieved this, for he was now threatening to break into Black's territory with the sequence shown in **Dia. 43**. If Black defended as in **Dia. 44** or in some such way, then White would be alive and could play 't', getting at least 38 points on the right side. With komi, White would seem to be a little bit ahead, but the outcome of the game would turn on Black's yose play on the upper side.

Figure 13 (147–163).

Fujisawa had just one minute to think about his next move. This was the crucial point of the game, and he could have easily used an hour to sort out the yose and hunt for a winning play. Considering the time pressure under which it was made, Black 47 was a brilliant choice. After Ishida pushed through with 50–58 Fujisawa had the cut at 59 to play.

Ishida had to be careful in answering Black 59, for White 1 and 3 in **Dia. 45** would have gotten him into real trouble. Black would attack at 6 and 8, and if White played 9 then his whole center group would die as shown. If White played 10 then Black would play 9 himself, cutting off six white stones and winning the game. White 60 and 62 in the figure were absolutely necessary, and so it was Fujisawa who took the yose point on the right side at 63, thus making up for the loss he had suffered in the upper left. He could not, by the way, have extended even one point farther down the side, for then White would have undercut him at 't'. At the end of this figure please observe that Black 'u' would be pointless since White could make two eyes with either 's' or 'v'.





Dia. 45

Figure 13 (147—163)

Figure 14 (164–178).

This figure is easy to understand. Ishida made a large sente yose play at 64. Black 65 deprived White of the ability to make a second eye at 'v' and threatened Black 76, with the same implications as Black 8 in Dia. 45. White played kikashi with 66–75 before defending at 76 and then Black had to play 77. White 78 was the last of the truly large yose points.






Figure 14 (164—178)

Figure 15 (179–187).

Black 79 and 81 were the only way to answer White 78, holding down White's profit and making territory in the center. Black 1 in **Dia. 46** would clearly be ineffective, allowing White one or two more points on the side and gaining nothing in the center. At the end of this figure White 'w' was the largest yose play, but first there was 'x' which was sente for both sides.





Dia. 46

Figure 15 (179—187)




Figure 16 (188–200)

Figure 16 (188–200).

Ishida took the two most important yose points at 88 and 90, but then Fujisawa got Black 95, which was only slightly smaller. White came nosing into Black's center at 200 and the game was frightfully close. We think the reader can understand the plays of this figure without any difficulty.





Figure 17 (201–215)




Dia. 47
⑨connects


Figure 17 (201–215).

Although the game was close, Ishida was now in control as he made a large sente yose play at 4. White 10 was worth six points, or $5\frac{2}{3}$ if the reader insists on counting fractions for ko. Black 11 was played not to gain any profit, but just to gain an extra minute in which to think. Fujisawa completed the defense of his center territory with Black 15.

Since he had to play two stones, 9 and 15, to get only seven or eight points of territory in the center, the reader may wonder why Black did not play 9 at 'y', earning six points with one play. Black 9, however, kept the upper right corner from being isolated, which was worth a point or two, and Black 15 was an important atari, so these two plays were really worth more than just the seven or eight points of center territory. The reader may easily verify that if Black had let White play 9 and thus rescue △, he would have lost by a few points.



Dia. 48



Dia. 49

It may even seem that Black 15 was larger than White 10, but if Ishida had played 1 and so on in **Dia. 47**, he would have gained only about four points in the upper part of the board while losing six points in the lower part. If he started with 3 instead of 1 in Dia. 47 Black could start a complicated ko fight by answering at 1 himself. White 7 in Dia. 47 cannot be omitted else the white group dies as shown in **Dia. 48** or **Dia. 49**.

Figure 18 (216–231).

It was not a mistake for Ishida to let his opponent have Black 17, even though this point was sente for both sides. Black 17 gained Fujisawa two points, but he could have done just as well by playing 'z', answered again by White 18, then playing 29 and 31 in sente. Black 23 was worth one or two points in gyaku yose, reducing White's territory by one point and causing 'e' to become Black's sente. White 26 and Black 31 were miai. Ishida could have fought a ko in the center instead of playing 26, but such complications were unnecessary.

The remainder of the yose is easy to read out, all plays being worth one point. White has sente yose at 'a' and 'b', after which he can play gyaku yose at 'c', (or 'd' or 'e'). Black now has sente yose at 'd' and 'e' which he can take before playing gyaku yose at 'f'. White can win the game by playing 'g', forcing Black 'h', and then playing 'i'. This leaves four ko's on the board, and each player inevitably fills two of them. If Black fills at 29 and 16 and White fills the two on the left side, the final count becomes:

White		Black	
Lower left	2	Upper left	18
Center	5	Lower left	13
Upper side	11	Center	14
Lower right	33	Upper right	10
	51		55

With komi, White wins by half a point.




Figure 18 (216–231)

Figure 19 (232–252).

The order of moves did not exactly follow our analysis, but the result was the same. This dramatic game ended at eight o'clock in the evening. Half a point sent Ishida on his way toward the top of the Honinbo League.




Figure 19 (232–251)
51 connects

Time elapsed: White: 6 hrs. 42 min.
Black: 8 hrs. 59 min.

CHAPTER 6: Chino-Ishida

Two weeks after beating Fujisawa Hosai, Ishida took on Chino, 7-dan, with a chance to move into a tie for first place in the Honinbo League. He was generally expected to win this game, for Chino had made a poor showing in the league so far.

Chino Tadahiko was born in 1937 and apprenticed to Nakamura, 8-dan, at the age of thirteen. In 1953 he became shodan and in 1966 he reached 7-dan. He had a good year in 1970, winning eighteen games, taking eighth place in the Professional Best Ten tournament and, of course, entering the Honinbo League.

Figure 1 (1–32).

For the first time in the Honinbo League Ishida held black. After Black 9 in the upper left corner there are many possible variations, of which the joseki played in this game is the most complicated and the most popular. Kajiwara, 9-dan, discovered it. Please observe the order of Black 23, 25, and 27. If 27 is played first, then White can answer 23 at 25. We shall mention just one of the alternatives, White 1 and 3 in **Dia. 1** instead of 16 in the figure, so that the reader will realize that in this joseki White can choose to take either the corner or the outside.






Figure 1 (1 –32)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

After White 28 Black can play 'a' to complete his encirclement of the corner, but the tenuki has been popular recently and Ishida took a big point at 29. Black 31, making a double wing extension from the ikken shimari, was natural but White 32 was questionable. Perhaps Chino should have played White 1 in **Dia. 2**, after which Black might defend his stones on the left side with a play like Black 2, temporarily abandoning his stones on the upper side.




Figure 2 (33–67)

Figure 2 (33–67).

The reason that White 32 was questionable is that 33 was such a good point for Black. The sequence up to White 52 followed naturally, and by attacking White's weak stones Black began to build a huge territory in the upper right corner in sente. He then defended his own weak stones with 53 and 55, but White resolutely attacked with 56 to 66. When Black connected at 67 the stage was set for a big semeai on the left side.





Figure 3 (68–100)

Figure 3 (68–100).

This semeai was extremely hard to figure out. Ishida played what he thought was a good point at 69, but White 70 was also good and the black stones died. It was a loss Ishida could afford, especially since Chino made a serious mistake in the subsequent fighting, failing to foresee Black 79. Ishida captured two stones, securing a large corner territory and leaving behind no weak points for White to exploit. Instead of White 78, Chino should have played tsunagi at 1 in **Dia. 3.** He would then have been two moves ahead in the semeai and a cutting point would have remained at 'a'.

Ishida took a firm lead simply by defending his own territory at 85, 93, etc., and Chino's last hope lay in getting some spectacular result out of White 100.



Dia. 3

Figure 4 (101–131).

Ishida's ko capture on the upper side was rather large, and although he gave up two stones to make it he kept sente and secured victory with his plays on the lower side. Chino was behind by about twenty points, minus komi, when he gave up.

Ishida now had a 4–1 record in the league and shared first place with Fujisawa Hosai.




Figure 4 (101–131)

CHAPTER 7: Kano-Ishida

On the last day of March Ishida met his sixth opponent in the Honınbo League, Kano Yoshinori. The week before this game he had moved back into second place as Fujisawa Hosai beat Hoshino, so now he was seeking to regain a tie for first place.

Kano was born in 1928 and apprenticed to a professional go player in 1938. He became shodan in 1943 and nine dan in 1968. This was his fourth year in the Honinbo League.

Figure 1 (1–51).

Ishida held black. The moves up to White 16 were all standard joseki, but Black 17 and 19 were something of an innovation. Even 9-dan professionals are prone to make bad judgements in unfamiliar situations, and Kano erred without delay by playing 20. **Dia. 1** shows what he should have done. After Black 8 there White has some weak stones, but he can put up a good fight because Black has weak stones too. Black 21 in the figure was sente, threatening **Dia. 2**, and when Ishida played 25 he felt that he was already well in the lead. This feeling grew when he got to play 35. Kano finally went on the offense when he played 46, threatening both the right and lower sides. The right side was the more severely threatened, so Ishida played 51 to make sabaki there.






Figure 1 (1–51)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (52–101).

Ishida managed nicely on the right side in the sequence up to 59, and Kano invaded the lower side at 60. He gained a good deal in the corner when he played 72, but Ishida was far out in front as he took large points at 73 and 75. White 78 was a big sente play. Compare it with Black 1 in **Dia. 3**, which gives two eyes to the Black group and, if White plays tenuki, wins back most of the territory lost to White's invasion.

In answer to White 84 Ishida took another large point at 85. Black 87 prepared to attack in the center and enabled him to extract further profit from the lower left corner in sente with 91–98. He now cut White's weak center stones with 99 and 101, but these plays were wrong. If he had cut the other way by playing 99 at 100 the game would have been over quickly.





Figure 2 (52—101)
71 connects



Dia. 3
④ tenuki

Figure 3 (102–147).

Kano was able to save all of his stones by playing 2, and Ishida had to go back to work to win. He now tried for a large center by playing 9. Kano thought it too dangerous to play 14 at 15. The exchange from 14 to 24 ended in the white group's getting connected to the upper left corner while the center territory began to fall into Black's hands.





Figure 3 (102—147)
❼ takes ko ⓫ and ㉑ connect

With Black 25 Ishida put emphasis on the center. If he played 1 in **Dia. 4** White had a tesuji at 2. In Dia. 4 it is not so easy to catch the four white stones in the center.

With White 26 Kano put emphasis on the upper side, but now Ishida played 27 and took a huge center. When he played 31 he was planning to follow with 'a', but he changed his mind and played 33 instead, finishing in sente and going to 43. The end of this figure saw him back in control of the game in spite of his losses on the left and upper sides.



Dia. 4

Figure 4 (148–200).

White 48 and 50 were big yose plays, but Kano was still about 5 points behind as Ishida played 51. White 68 and Black 69 were miai, approximately. Kano needed both of them to win.




Figure 4 (148—200)

Figure 5 (201–227).

The final count was:

White		Black	
Upper side	33	Left side	22
Lower left	5	Center	67
Lower right	23		89
Upper right	18		
	79		

Ishida had won by $5\frac{1}{2}$ points.




Figure 5 (201–227)

He and Fujisawa Hosai now had identical 5–1 records in the league with one game each to go. The Honinbo League was coming to an exciting close, and the Mainichi Newspaper had cunningly saved the crucial games for the end. The go world waited anxiously to see who would challenge Rin Kai Ho for the Honinbo title.

CHAPTER 8: Shuko-Ishida

On April 1st the Honinbo League stood as follows:

Fujisawa Hosai	5–1
Ishida	5–1
Kato	5–2
Fujisawa Shuko	3–2
Sakata	2–3
Kano	2–5
Hoshino	2–5
Chino	1–6

Only three games remained to be played: Hosai vs. Sakata, Ishida vs. Shuko, and Sakata vs. Shuko. The first two of these games were played on April 7 and 8, side by side in the Nihon Kiin in Takanawa. If Ishida and Hosai both won they would be tied for first place and a play-off would be necessary. If they both lost then the play-off would also include Kato and perhaps Shuko. If one of them won while the other lost, then he would become challenger to Rin Kai Ho.

Fujisawa Shuko was born in 1925. Although 6 years younger, he is the uncle of Fujisawa Hosai. He reached shodan in 1940 and 9-dan in 1963. No newcomer to the Honinbo League, he had challenged both Takagawa and Sakata, (unsuccessfully), for the Honinbo title in years past. In 1962 he emerged at the top of a thirteen man league to become the first Meijin since Shusai had given that title to the Nihon Kiin. He had lost to Sakata in the next year's Meijin sen, but in the fall of 1970 he regained the title by beating Rin. After he became Meijin for the second time his social life had waxed busy and his go suffered somewhat, but he was still a strong opponent for Ishida. A very quick player, he often uses up less than half of his time in tournament games. Sometimes this causes him to make blunders, but on the whole his go is powerful and artistic and he is one of the strongest of the 9-dans. He is good at handling thickness, whether his own or his opponents', and prefers making small, strong positions to large, loose ones.





Figure 1 (1–11)

Figure 1 (1–11).

As in his previous game, Ishida placed his first stone on the upper right hand hoshi, and his opponent answered in the lower left corner. This prevented him from playing diagonal hoshi, a fuseki pattern which he likes, but he willingly played parallel hoshi instead.

White 6 has been popular recently, perhaps because of the idea of playing tenuki after Black 9. It is joseki for White to play 'a' or 'b' and for Black then to play 'c', but the tenuki is more flexible. There is no real danger in it, for if Black attacks at 'd' then White can defend at 'a', while if Black plays 'b' then White can extend to 'e', and because of the absence of Black 'c' White has lots of room to play on the lower side.

Ishida answered White 10 with an ogeima at 11. He avoided the more usual ikken tobi because he did not like the prospect of White 2 and 4 in **Dia. 1.**



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (12–31).

Fujisawa made a shimari with 12, and Ishida took the initiative on the right side with Black 13. White 14 and 16 were a natural joseki to employ against this hasami, but White 20 was a surprise. The standard joseki goes as in **Dia. 2.** It leaves White with sente, but later Black can attack at 'a'. This attack can be answered at 'b' or 'c', but White 'b' is a bit low while White 'c' leaves 'b' as a good kikashi







Figure 2 (12–31)




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

for Black. White could play 'c' immediately after Black 4 to forestall Black 'a', but Fujisawa preferred his new variation to this.


In this variation note the function of Black 21. If Black simply played kakae at 1 in **Dia. 3**, then White would be able to answer 3 at 4 instead of at 'd'.

Before playing Black 23, Ishida must have thought of **Dia. 4.** He would have been very happy to see White 2 there, allowing him to play 3. But he would not have been so happy to see White 2 in **Dia. 5**, which is how Fujisawa would have answered Black 1. In that diagram White can take the corner in sente with 8, and White 10 leaves him in a good position to fight because Black's stones on the lower side are weak. Ishida may also have thought of Black 1 in **Dia. 6**, but it would make bad shape.

Fujisawa's new variation gave him more territory and thickness than in Dia. 2, but at the cost of sente. Ishida took a large point at 27 on the upper side, expecting **Dia. 7**, but Fujisawa surprised him again by playing at the vital point in the lower right with White 28. This play was slow but mighty, giving White great thickness for use in the fighting to come. Picture a black stone there for comparison.




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Figure 3 (32–40).

Black now had an impressive moyo in the upper right quarter of the board, and White had to deal with it before it got any larger. He played kikashi on the outside at 32 and 34, then struck at the corner with 36. Ishida could not defend his corner with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 8,** for in that diagram the black moyo is more than adequately reduced and Black △ is left floating in the face of White's thickness. Therefore he played 37 and White played 38. Let us see what possibilities there were for Black 39.







Dia. 8

Figure 3 (32–40)


To begin with, Black 1 and 3 in **Dia. 9** were out of the question. It would be very easy for White to break up the once great moyo with 4 to 12. Black 3 in **Dia. 10** would be interesting but even more inept, as the sequence up to White 16 plainly shows.



Dia. 9
7 connects




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

With **Dia. 11** we are back in the realm of possibility. After Black 1 and 3, White would cut at 4, threatening to break through at 'a' or at 'b'. Black would have to prevent this break-through by playing 5 in **Dia. 12**, and 6-13 would follow as a matter of course. White 14 is a good tesuji. White would not like to play 'c' and have Black play 14, but White 14, Black 'd', White 'c' would be quite satisfactory. Instead of playing 'd' however, Black would continue as in **Dia. 13.** He would have to crawl on the second line, but he would be rewarded by the capture of a large corner, and although Black 27 is gote, White would be left with cutting points at 'e' and 'f'. This final result is tolerable.


In the actual game Ishida rejected diagrams 11–13 and connected at 39, inviting White to live in the corner with the sequence shown in **Dia. 14.** After White 9 in that diagram Black has bad aji at 'g', but he has sente with which to do something about it. White's corner is pretty small, and Black may succeed in getting a large territory on the outside.




Dia. 12




Dia. 13




Dia. 14



Dia. 15




Dia. 16




Dia. 17

For the reader's information, if White 5 in Dia. 14 were replaced by White 1 in **Dia. 15**, then Black would take the vital point at 2 and a 1-play yose ko would develop. The same ko would occur if White played 1 in **Dia. 16** instead of 1 in Dia. 14. Another alternative to 1 in Dia. 14 is White 1 in **Dia. 17**. This would make a good life in the corner, but the thickness Black gets from his pon-nuki promises much territory on the outside, and White △ would become a wasted stone.


White 40 in the figure was completely unexpected and excellent. Ishida did not dare to play 1 in **Dia. 18** for fear of what might become of Black ▲ after White 2. Black 1 in that diagram does not entirely finish off the two white stones in the corner either, for there is still the aji of White 'g'. Black 1 in **Dia. 19** would be safer, but White could play lightly at 2, then live in the corner. Not much would be left of Black's moyo. **Dia. 20** shows another unattractive possibility. After White 10 Black could not deal with both White 6 and White 'h'. Ishida was beginning to wish that he had followed the simple course of diagrams 11–13.



Dia. 18



Dia. 19



Dia. 20





Figure 4 (41–49)


Figure 4 (41–49).

Black 41 was the only possible way to play. White pressed with 42, and after giving atari at 43 Black had to crawl with 45 and 47. White could now have captured 43 in shicho, but then Black 'f' would have killed the corner, so he played 48 and let Black attack on the outside with 49. The moves of this figure were not obvious, but there was actually no choice about them. If, for instance, Black had not crawled with 45 and 47 but played aggressively with 1 in **Dia. 21,** White would have been able to live in the corner and to make beautiful shape in the center, as shown. Nor would Black 1 and 3 in **Dia. 22** have been good, allowing White to get fifteen points or so on the right side. If Black 11 in Dia. 22 is omitted, then White can play a shicho breaking move in the lower left corner. Please compare Dia. 22 with Dia. 14.

The course of action to follow Black 49 was also plainly marked. It was clear to all that White would play atari at 'g' followed by hane at 'h'.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22






Figure 5 (50–65)

Figure 5 (59–65).


The maneuvers begun by White 40 ran their inevitable course in the moves of this figure. Black 53 and 55 were necessary, as you can see by comparing the figure with **Dia. 23**, where they are omitted. Black 63, White 64, and Black 65 were all very large points. Without White 64 the corner would become ko, as shown in **Dia. 24** for example. Please be aware that at the end of this figure Black was in a position to capture some white stones with 1 in **Dia. 25**. Please also notice the bad aji of White 'i' in that diagram and the figure. All in all there was not much left of the original moyo, especially if we subtract the profit White had got in the corner. Fujisawa had dealt successfully with one black moyo in the upper right, but now he was faced with a second one on the lower side.



Dia. 23



Dia. 24



Dia. 25





Figure 6 (66–70)

Figure 6 (66–70).


The scene shifted as Fujisawa invaded with White 66. White 70, which deprived the Black stones of eye space in the corner, was an important point for both sides, but all of the moves in this figure were rather difficult to decide upon.

After the game Fujisawa remarked that either before or after playing White 68 he should have played 1 in **Dia. 26**. Black could be expected to play 2 and 4 to prevent White 'a', and then White would have the beginnings of eye shape.


In running fights one expects to see the ikken tobi, but both players avoided it in this figure. Fujisawa could have played 1 in **Dia. 27**, but he decided not to. Black 2 would become a good, easy move and after White 3 Black would have attractive plays at 'b', 'c', and 'd'. After White 68 Black could not play ikken tobi. Black 1 in **Dia. 28** just invites the nozoki at 2 and helps White to make good shape.



Dia. 26



Dia. 27



Dia. 28

Figure 7 (71–81).

Ishida attacked the two white stones with 71 and 73, then played 75, defending his own group and aiming at a future watari at 'j'. Black 75 was the sealed move ending the first day. Next morning Fujisawa quickly played White 76, 78, and 80, but he was taken aback by Black 81.

Black 81 was stronger than it looks, and it was hard to know what to do about it. If White connected at 1 in **Dia. 29**, then Black would play 2 and 4. White could continue with 5 and 7 and live in the corner, but then Black 10 would eat up most of the territory on the left side, and White's center stones would be weak. More interesting would be the continuation shown in **Dia. 30**. After White 7 in that diagram there are a bewildering number of variations to be read out. Should Black play 'a' or 'b?' If he plays 'b' then White will cut at 'a' and he will have to crawl up the second line. If he plays 'a', then White can continue to press at 'b'. In either case, at what point should Black stop crawling or White stop pressing and play 'c?' These are not easy questions and we shall not answer them, since Fujisawa did not actually play either Dia. 29 or Dia. 30.






Figure 7 (71–81)




Dia. 29




Dia. 30

White 1 in **Dia. 31** also looks possible, but Black 8 there is very severe. If White now plays 'c' Black will be happy to connect at 'd', whereas if White plays 'd' Black can play 'e'. Note that if Black later cuts at 1 in **Dia. 32**, the corner cannot live as it did in Dia. 29 due to the presence now of Black 3.


White 1 in **Dia. 33** can definitely be ruled out as an inferior play, but what was Black to do–accept the unattractive result in Dia. 29, brave the uncharted waters of Dia. 30, or risk the dangers of Dia. 31? Fujisawa found another way to play that was straightforward and good, as we shall see in the next figure.



Dia. 31



Dia. 32
❾ at △



Dia. 33

Figure 8 (82–100).

White 82 and 84 were what Fujisawa came up with. Once they were played, the rest of this figure followed automatically and we shall let these moves pass without comment. Rather we shall try to explain just what this sequence had brought about.

After White 100 Black had of course to play a stone to capture the six stones he had surrounded. Suppose he played 1 in **Dia. 34**. White could then save the corner with 2–10, which would be pretty big, but Black could play 11, which would be even bigger. This stone could not be cut off because of the aji supplied by Black △. White's center group would be in grave need of attention, and this would give Black the chance to go to work on White's territory in the upper left.







Figure 8 (82–100)




Dia. 34
❺ connects



Dia. 35



Dia. 36



Dia. 37
❼ connects

White, however, should spurn the chance to save the corner and play 2 in **Dia. 35** instead. If Black played 3, then 4 and 6 would give White over 60 points in the upper left and a sure victory. Much the same thing would happen if Black played 1 and 3 in **Dia. 36.** He would thus win the semeai and capture the corner, but he could no longer jump out to 'a' and again White would make a mammoth territory.

After White 2 in Dia. 35 Black would have to play 3 in **Dia. 37,** letting White save the corner after all. This diagram gives the correct general interpretation of the situation, although it is wrong in one detail.






Figure 9 (101–112)
❾ connects

Figure 9 (101–112).

Black 1 was the right play, and the game proceeded along the lines we have already indicated in Dia. 37. There is, however, a difference of 5 points between White's territory in that diagram and in this figure, a matter of no small importance.





Dia. 38


Figure 10 (113–122)

Figure 10 (113–122).


Ishida seemed to be trailing a bit after the last figure, but he took the initiative with Black 13. Fujisawa decided to dodge this attack by playing 14. Had he captured Black's stone instead, he would have been faced with Black 2 in **Dia. 38.** In that diagram White is safe for the moment when he plays 3, but Black 4 aims at Black 'a' and there is no telling what will happen next.

White 18 was a mistake. White should have played 'k', defending his corner and greatly enlarging his territory on the side. Of course Fujisawa had a reason for playing 18; he was worried about Black 1, 3, and 5 in **Dia. 39.** He had read out the continuation shown in **Dia. 40**, which at first glance does seem inevitable after Dia. 39 and costs him his four stones on the lower side. He had missed White 6 in **Dia. 41**. There Black 7 is answered by White 8, or Black 'b' by White 'c', or Black 'c' by White 'd', and nothing gets cut off.


Ishida took advantage of his opponent's mistake by invading the corner at 19. Fujisawa did not dare to answer with 1 in **Dia. 42.** White would then simply play 2, waiting to see how best to use the considerable aji which would be left in the corner. This aji mostly develops from Black 'e'. Think of Black 'f' in that connection, for instance. Think also of Black 1 and 3 in **Dia. 43** which create a cutting point at 'g'. White must play 4 there if he wants to kill the corner without a ko fight, but then Black can create another cutting point at 'h' if he so desires. All this would make it hard for White to hang on to his territory. By playing 20 and 22 Fujisawa made it possible for Ishida to live in the corner by playing 'm', but he compensated for this by strengthening his own position, aiming to play White 'n'.




Dia. 39




Dia. 40



Dia. 41



Dia. 42



Dia. 43

Figure 11 (123–130).

Before living in the corner Ishida had to prevent his opponent from making a killing in the center, so he played 23. Fujisawa answered at 24, again aiming at White 'n', but Ishida kept right on with 25 and 27, then found an excellent tesuji at 29. If Fujisawa now played 1 and so on in **Dia. 44**, he would just be helping Black to make territory in the center, and after Black 10 he would be unable to stop both 'p' and 'm'. Therefore he simply played 30 in the figure to kill the corner.





Figure 11 (123–130)



Dia. 44

Figure 12 (131–141).

This allowed Ishida to play the sequence shown in this figure. Fujisawa had kept at least 34 points in the upper left, but now he had to fight a ko in the center.




Figure 12 (131–141)






Figure 13 (142–155)
㊻, ㊾ take ko



Dia. 45




Dia. 46

Figure 13 (142–155).

White had to connect at 42, and the ko fight began. It was a fight which Black was bound to win, since he had many ko threats and White had to look after his center group. The defense of that group was the main issue of the fight, and although White 44 and 50 were good plays, White 52 was a mistake. Fujisawa thought for a moment that he could capture Black's stones, but this was not so as you can see in **Dia. 45.**

White 52 caused a terrible deterioration of Fujisawa's position. Without the 52–55 exchange White could have made one eye on the lower side as in **Dia. 46.** Instead of 52, Fujisawa should have played 1 in **Dia. 47.** His center group would then have been perfectly safe, for if Black played 2 and 4 to take away the eye on the lower edge, White could live with 5. Had Fujisawa followed this diagram the game would have been extremely close.



Dia. 47






Figure 14 (156–161)
㊾ takes ko

Figure 14 (156–161).

After the mistake in the last figure it was a different story. Black 61 dealt the center group a fatal blow, and suddenly the game was lost, although Fujisawa was not ready to give up yet. "Big stones never die," the saying goes, and there were lots of tricks for him to try. There was White 1 in **Dia. 48**, for instance. If Black mistakenly plays 2, then White 5 threatens to make an eye on the lower edge, and if White 7 is answered by Black 8, then White has escaped. If Black plays 8 in **Dia. 49** instead, a complicated sequence ending in a ko fight ensues. In this way White might yet win the game.



Dia. 48



Dia. 49
㉓ takes ko




Figure 15 (162–172)

Figure 15 (161–172).

Fujisawa played 62 and Ishida connected at 63 without a moment's pause. Their eyes met over the go board. This was to be the final struggle of the game.

Fujisawa now began to play very slowly, seeking desperately for a way to save his stones. White 64 and 66 cost him 10 and 17 minutes, respectively. Black 67 prevented White 9 in Dia. 48, blocking that avenue of escape. An hour's thought went into White 68, but Black 69 put an end to any hope White had of making a second eye. White 70 and 72, which attacked the Black stones in the center, were his only chance.





Figure 16 (173–183)

Figure 16 (173–183).

Fujisawa surrendered on seeing Black 83. If he had connected at 1 in **Dia. 50**, then Ishida would have cut at 2 and 4. White could play 5 and 7, but to no avail. Quite apart from the ko at 'q', the worst that could happen to Black in the ensuing semeai would be seki, but the lower central White group would still be dead. The reader is invited to play it out for himself.

This game was over in the mid-afternoon of the second day. On the other go board in the same room the battle between Fujisawa Hosai and Sakata was still raging fiercely. That game had developed in typical Hosai fashion, with several large groups of stones floating around eyeless in the center even in the late middle game, and it was not until several hours later that Fujisawa Hosai, having lost one of his own floating groups and unable to catch any of Sakata's in return, was forced to resign. Thus did Ishida become Honinbo challenger. After losing to Kato, he had reeled off six straight victories against strong opponents in the Honinbo League, and now had the honor of meeting Rin Kai Ho in the title match.

Time elapsed: White: 6 hrs. 41 min.
Black: 6 hrs.



Dia. 50

Final standing of the Honinbo League:

Ishida	6–1
Fujisawa Hosai	5–2
Kato	5–2
Sakata	4–3
Fujisawa Shuko	3–4
Kano	2–5
Hoshino	2–5
Chino	1–6

CHAPTER 9: The Honinbo Sen: First Game

Rin Kai Ho was born on May 6, 1942, in Shanghai and came to Taiwan after the war, where he learned go from his older brother. In 1952 Go Sei Gen visited Taiwan and happened to meet the ten year old Rin. So impressed was he with the boy's talent for go that he brought him back to Japan to study. 1954 saw him living in Osaka, apprenticed to Fujita 6-dan. He became shodan in 1955, and nidan later the same year. He continued to earn the higher ranks one after the other, setting a speed record for rapid promotion and reaching 9-dan in 1967. He now lives in Tokyo and is a protege of Go Sei Gen.

Rin's first success in the major go tournaments was a dramatic one. In 1965 he challenged Sakata for the Meijin title, the highest honor in the go world, and won, becoming the youngest Meijin in history. In 1968 he also acquired the Honinbo title.

The Honinbo Sen, although now second in prestige to the Meijin Sen, is the oldest of the Japanese go tournaments. It began in 1941, the first title going to Sekiyama, 6-dan. At first it was a bi-annual affair, so the next title match, which was won by Hashimoto Utaro, was held in 1943. War halted the match in 1945, but in 1946 the author of this book got the title, and defended it against Kitani in the next match in 1947. A three year hiatus followed, after which the tournament was held annually. Hashimoto Utaro regained the title in 1950 and defended it in 1951. In 1952 it was won by a mild-mannered, 36-year-old 7-dan with a calm and elegant style of play named Takagawa Kaku. This was the beginning of a nine year dynasty during which Takagawa held off Kitani, Sugiuchi, and Shimamura twice each and both Fujisawas once each, remaining Honinbo through 1960. The challenger able to defeat him finally appeared in 1961. He was Sakata Eio, and after seizing the Honinbo title he kept it for seven straight years until losing it to Rin in 1968.

When Rin won the title from Sakata he became both Honinbo and Meijin and was recognized as the top go player in Japan. Later the same year, however, he lost the Meijin title to Takagawa. He regained it in 1969 but lost it again in 1970, this time to Fujisawa Shuko. During this time he held on to the Honinbo title, defeating Kato in 1969 and Sakata in 1970, but he failed to win any of the other major titles, so when he met Ishida in the spring of 1971 he was Honinbo and nothing else.

Before the 1971 Honinbo Sen, Rin and Ishida had met just once over the go board. This had been one month before the beginning of the Honinbo title match, in the semifinal round of the Professional Best Ten tournament. In that game Rin

had built up a powerful attack, nearly killing a large group in the center, but a mistake at the very close of the middle game had cost him the victory. This meant that Ishida played Kajiwara for first place in the Best Ten tournament, a best-of-five title series. Since the Honinbo and Best Ten title matches are held at the same time of the year Ishida had to play the two concurrently, the one-day Best Ten games sandwiched in between the two-day Honinbo games.

The playing conditions for the games of the Honinbo title match are almost the same as those for the Honinbo League, described in Chapter 2. The main difference is that the games are played, at intervals of about ten days, in various hotels and resorts, each one in a different city, instead of at the Nihon Kiin in Tokyo. The games are also slightly longer. Ten hours are allotted each player instead of nine, and the starting time in the morning is 9 o'clock instead of 9:30. The first game was held on April 26 and 27 at the Gora hot spring resort in Hakone, with Takagawa, honorary Honinbo, looking on.

Figure 1 (1–15).

To decide sente in this first game Rin picked up a handful of white stones. Ishida placed two black stones on the go board and announced, "even-sente." An odd number of stones were found in Rin's hand, so the challenger played white. Sente would alternate in the succeeding games.

Rin, an old hand at Honinbo title matches, played Black 1 without hesitation. Ishida, the newcomer, thought for six minutes about White 2. Up to Black 7 this game was identical to the second game of the previous year's Honinbo Sen. In that game Sakata had played next at 'a', but Ishida played White 8. The reader may remember this move from the upper left corner of the game in chapter 6. Rin answered simply and quietly with 9, and Ishida played 10–14 to strengthen his position. These white moves are often seen. What latitude does Black have in responding to them?







Figure 1 (1—15)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3
❺ connects

Instead of Black 11, there is Black 1 in **Dia. 1**. This move is not established joseki, but it is not necessarily bad. The continuation from 2 to 6 is reasonable, after which Black might play 'a'. White could attack with 'b', which aims at the weak point 'c'.

There was no choice about Black 13, for Black 1 in **Dia. 2** is quite bad. White gets the corner and can attack Black's inadequate position at 'b'. Note how effective White 'd' is, too.

For Black 15 there was a real choice, for the sequence in **Dia. 3** is also joseki. Black gets more definite territory there, but the white stones have greater capacity for development.





Figure 2 (16–23)


Figure 2 (16–23).

Ishida played White 16 and 18 to build a large moyo in the lower right and Rin lost no time in entering it at 19. White 20 was a good reply to this kakari. It is often seen in situations like this, where White is strong in the surrounding area. It prevents once and for all Black's invasion at the 3–3 point, and it creates no weak points for Black to exploit. After considerable thought Rin played tsuke at 21 and cross-cut at 23 to make sabaki in this area.


There is a go proverb which tells us to play nobi in answer to a cross-cut, but



Dia. 4



Dia. 5
⑨ connects



Dia. 6

in this case it would give bad advice. If White played 1 in **Dia. 4** Black could live easily with 2 and 4. White would get sente, but △ would have considerable aji and Black could invade the right side without the slightest fear of jeopardizing his group on the lower side. Nor would White 1 in **Dia. 5** be good. Black could play 2, and if White ran from this atari with 3 he would get his stones on the left in trouble without accomplishing much on the right. Instead of White 3 in Dia. 5 White should play 1 in **Dia. 6.** Next he could attack with 3, an important point for building up his territory on the right, but the five white stones on the left would be insecure and Black would have sente.





Figure 3 (24–31).

White 24 and 26 were the only way to play. Ishida might next have followed **Dia. 7**, but he played White 28 in the figure instead. White 30 cost him considerable thought. He would have liked to attack at 'b' or 'c', but he decided that 30 was more important since it aimed to connect at 'd' and after all, Black 30 would give Black two eyes. Rin invaded the right side at 31, getting this stone in before Ishida had a chance to play 'b' or 'c'.



Dia. 7

Figure 4 (32–43).

White 32 was a good play, and there were now two separated weak black groups within White's moyo. Rin knew that he was in some danger, but he felt he could handle the situation as he played 33 and 35, gaining a small base on the side, then pressed on White's stone with 37. White could not cut with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 8.** After Black 10 there White cannot play 'a' because Black 'b' captures two stones in shicho, but if he plays 'b' the fighting will go badly for him, as shown in **Dia. 9.**






Figure 4 (32–43)




Dia. 8

Unable to cut, Ishida played 38 and Rin played kikashi at 39, destroying the shicho aji of Dia. 8. Black 41 was an aggressive move, putting far more pressure on the white stones than Black 'e' would have. Ishida got out with 42, Rin played 43, and now the focus of attention shifted to the upper side.

Black 41 may be compared with the familiar tsuke-nobi joseki shown in **Dia. 10.** The tsuke-nobi gives Black a firmer shape but lets White take sente, probably at 6 on the upper side. White's stones on the right side would be safe enough because White could play either 'c' or 'd' if attacked. Professional players seldom use the tsuke-nobi joseki.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Figure 5 (44–57).

Ishida's next two moves were a bit strange. White 44 was played to build up some power in the center, aiming at the black stones in the middle of the lower side, but it provoked Black 45 which threatened Black 'f'. A better way to play might have been White 1 in **Dia. 11**. If Black played 2 and 4 White could give up two stones in order to attack at 9, having aji at 'a' for later.

White 46 was Ishida's idea for making sabaki on the upper side, but a wari-uchi on the point between 47 and 50 might have been more sensible. White 50 was played with yosu miru strategy. Ishida forced Rin to commit himself to an answer to this move so that he could judge his future play according to it. After Black 51 Ishida had 'g' and 'h' to aim at.

Next came the cross-cut at White 52 and 54. Rin could not answer 56 at 'i' lest White live too easily in the corner, but notice that if 56 had been played without 52 and 54, 'i' is just where Black would have answered. It now appeared that Ishida might make sabaki by playing 'i' himself, but unfortunately the ko in **Dia. 12** was not good for him. If he won it and lived in the corner Rin would take a terrific profit with two moves somewhere on the outside.






Figure 5 (44–57)



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Figure 6 (58–62).

Since he could not play the atari, Ishida played White 58 to make sabaki. Sabaki is one of the most difficult phases of the game of go, and is Ishida's special strength. We shall examine the moves of this figure in some detail.

After White 58 Black could have played 1 in **Dia. 13** but then White would have made excellent sabaki with the hasami-tsuke at 2. If Black played 3 the sequence would continue as shown and Black, who already had one weak group in the middle of the lower side, would be in a lot of trouble. He could not claim a






Figure 6 (58–62)

big territory on the left side as long as weak points such as 'a' remained, and his upper right corner would become encircled. If Black played 1 in **Dia. 14** instead of 3 in Dia. 13 he would not get much of a result either, so Rin played Black 59 in the figure.


Now Ishida had a chance to play 1 in **Dia. 15**, but it was still not profitable for him to win the ko in the corner. Black could get too much by playing 6 and 8, or maybe 6 and 'b', and White's two stones △△ would become wasted. White 60 in the figure, not 1 in Dia. 15, was the vital point for making sabaki.




Dia. 13
⓫ connects




Dia. 14



Dia. 15




Dia. 16




Dia. 17


If Black 2 in Dia. 15 was good, what about Black 1 in **Dia. 16** to follow White 60 in the figure? These two moves seem to be the same, but they lead to somewhat different results. White could connect at 2, then make ko in the corner with 4, 6, and 8. Continuing as in **Dia. 17**, Black would make his two moves at 3 and 5 while White lived in the corner, but now White could attack at 6, looking for a chance to play 'c'.



Dia. 18
❾ connects



Dia. 19
❼ connects




Dia. 20


After the 61–62 exchange the situation was still complicated and difficult. If Rin now played 1 and 3 in **Dia. 18** White could have forced the sequence shown through White 18. He could not ask for a more beautiful sabaki shape. His wall would completely dominate the board. Black would have about 25 points in the upper left corner, but White would soon gain on the upper and left sides. This diagram is quite bad for Black, and we have put it in only as a good example of what he could not allow.

Instead of 3 in Dia. 18 Black would have to play 1 in **Dia. 19**, but then he would have to risk ko at 'd', and White would be doing well on the upper side.

After the game Rin showed **Dia. 20** as the correct way to play. White's shape on the upper side would be reasonably good, but Black's corner would be alive and he would have sente. He envisioned continuing as in **Dia. 21**, taking the urgent point at 9 and then getting 17 too after White lived in the upper left corner. If White played 2 in **Dia. 22** instead of 2 in Dia. 20, Black could get good shape in the center and fight ko in the corner and White would be badly off.



Dia. 21




Dia. 22

Figure 7 (63–75).

But Rin played 63 instead of 1 in Dias. 20 and 22, and Ishida sealed White 64 to end the first day. Next morning he continued on in sente through White 70, then attacked at 72. He had given up a large territory on the upper side, but his wall towering over the center and left side gave him good prospects at this point of the game. It took courage for Rin to run out at 73.

White 74 allowed Black to get the jump on White at 75, but if Ishida had played 1 in **Dia. 23** Rin could have managed easily with 2, threatening to play either 'a' or 'b'. At the end of this figure White could have cut with 1 in **Dia. 24**, but there again the Black group could easily run away.



Dia. 23





Figure 7 (63–75)



Dia. 24






Figure 8 (76–89)

Figure 8 (76–89).

Rin began to counterattack when he played 79. Ishida played a kikashi at 80 and a probe at 82, then played 84 to make sabaki on the right side. He was expecting **Dia. 25**, but Rin thought for 48 minutes and played Black 89. Confronted with this move, Ishida was helpless. If he played 1 in **Dia. 26** Black's center group would get away easily and he would suffer a big loss on the right side.



Dia. 25



Dia. 26





Figure 9 (90–100)

Figure 9 (90–100).

The pace of the game slowed as both players took time to read out carefully all of the possible ways to fight. Ishida thought for 36 minutes about White 90. Rin thought for 54 minutes before playing 91, making sure that he could follow it with 93 without losing his center stones. He also had to be sure that White could not get away with 1 in **Dia. 27.** In that diagram White saves his right side stones, but his center becomes a little bit weak when Black plays 14. White 92 and Black 93 were exchanged quickly, but slow play resumed with 94, (10 minutes), and 95, (11 minutes). In all about $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours were spent on the moves of this figure and the next.



Dia. 27






Figure 10 (101–116)
❾ connects

Figure 10 (101–116).


Ishida cut at 2 and 4, and Rin cut in turn at 5. Ishida played kikashi with 6–12, but eventually he had to face his predicament. After Black 13 he needed to play 1 in **Dia. 28** to save his six stones on the right side, but then Black would follow with 2–8. Black 8 was the vital point. The black stones in the center would suffer from bad shape and White could play 1–7 in **Dia. 29**, but Black 8 there would catch White in damezumari. If he played 1 in **Dia. 30** a semeai between the black and white center groups would occur which White would lose. This was Ishida's predicament, and White 14 in the figure was the only way out of it. Rin captured six stones on the right side, but with White 16 Ishida captured four black stones on the upper side. Does the reader see this?



Dia. 28



Dia. 29
❹ connects



Dia. 30

Figure 11 (117–124).

Ishida made a large capture when he played 22, but Black 23 was also big and there was little chance left for White. Rin could count at least 55 points on the right side and at least 10 on the upper side. If we assume Black 'j', White 'k', Black 'm', White 'n' in the lower left corner then Black would have at least 10 points there for a grand total of 75 or more. White would have 35 on the lower side and 10 or 15 on the upper side, so he needed to outscore his opponent by 25 points or so on the left side to be in the running. Considering the aji of Black 'p' this looked impossible, but Ishida bravely began with White 24, a good point since it made 'j' his sente.




Figure 11 (117–124)





Figure 12 (125–135)

Figure 12 (125–135).

Rin forestalled his opponent's sente by playing 25 himself and Ishida had no choice but to play 26 and try for a large territory on the left side. Even if he got 25 points there he would not quite win, because he would have to let Black take two of the big yose points 'q', 'r', 's', and 't'.

Rin set about trimming White's left side down to size with Black 27 and 29, the familiar tsuke-nobi. Ishida could not afford to play 'u' when Rin played 33, for then 'q' would have won the game for Black by a modest but safe margin. Black 35 was the last move that Rin spent any amount of time thinking about, (18 minutes). What he had to fear was, of course, the cut at White 1 in **Dia. 31.** The natural answer, the counter-cut at Black 2, would fail spectacularly, Black losing his stones in shicho.



Dia. 31
⓬connects





Figure 13 (136–144)

Figure 13 (136–145).

Rin figured out that he could answer White 36 with Black 37. If White, after exchanging 38 and 39, played 1 in **Dia. 32**, then Black could cut at 2 and although White could capture a few stones with 3 and 5 he could not get anywhere near enough to win. So Ishida played 40 and 42, letting Black capture White 36, then made one last desperate cut at White 44.



Dia. 32

Figure 14 (145–163).

Ishida could not have omitted 46 or 48. Had he played 1 in **Dia. 33** instead of White 46, for instance, Black would have ended the game with 2 etc. There are several variations to be read out in this sequence, such as White 3 at 'a' or White 5 at 8, but they all end in Black's victory. We leave the reader to work them out for himself, as well as to work out what would happen if White 48 in the figure were omitted. He may also be interested in verifying that if Black had played 48 instead of 45 he would have been crushed.

The game ended in a ko fight. Rin had foreseen this ko when he played Black 35 in Figure 12, and he knew that he could win it. Ishida knew it too, and he gave up when Rin played Black 63. Black had 'v', 'w', and various other ko threats on the left side. White had a good series of ko threats of the right side, starting with 'x', but not quite enough. The reader may want to play out this ko fight for himself.

So Ishida had met his match at last. He had put up a brave fight, but Rin's strength and steadiness had been too much for him. Indeed the game had been decided by the tesuji at Black 89 in Figure 8. If Rin had played as powerfully in the rest of the Honinbo Sen as he had in the first game, the title would surely have been his for a fourth straight year.





Figure 14 (145–163)
58, 61 take ko



Dia. 33

Time elapsed: White: 7 hrs. 14 min.
Black: 9 hrs. 24 min.

CHAPTER 10: The Second Game

The second game of the Honinbo Sen took place on May 6 and 7 at the Toyo Hotel in Osaka. It turned out to be the most exciting game of the title series, as we shall see.

Figure 1 (1–11).

Ishida played diagonal hoshi with 1 and 3 while Rin played diagonal komoku. In this common fuseki pattern 5 and 6 are often played as miai. Black 7 began a difficult joseki which has many variations. Some would prefer the simpler play shown in **Dia. 1.**

The reader will notice that the first ten moves of this game were almost identical with the first ten moves of the Oeda-Ishida game in Chapter 1. In addition they were exactly identical with a game from the previous year's Meijin sen, a game in which Rin, (White), defeated Fujisawa Shuko. In those two games Black's next play was at 'a', but Ishida now chose the more old-fashioned Black 11.





Figure 1 (1–11)



Dia. 1


Figure 2 (12–18).


Rin played 12, and 13–18 followed automatically. We shall limit our explanation of these plays to White 18, a high caliber move which an amateur might miss. Why not simply White 1 in **Dia. 2**? Black would play kikashi at 2, then extend to 4. After White 5, Black could live in the corner with 6.

A similar possibility existed after White 18, as shown in **Dia. 3**. An amateur might think that Dia. 2 is better for White than Dia. 3, where Black has been able to play kikashi at 6 and force White to make an empty triangle. A professional sees that after Dia. 3 White can play 'b'or'c' without fear of being cut and concludes that the exchange of Black 6 for White 1 there, which is the only difference between diagrams 2 and 3, is good for White.

White 18 invites the hanekomi at 1 in **Dia. 4**, which creates cutting aji at 'd'. White, however, can always find some way to deal with Black 'd', for if he cannot capture it he can give up his own two stones, and the three stone wall consisting of White 2, 4, and △ has some power for development. Dia. 4 is the standard joseki.

Dia. 5 is parallel to the standard joseki, but here again White 1 is seen to be ineffective. This stone is doing very little work, and White would like to move it out to 'e' where it would have some influence.






Dia. 2


Figure 2 (12–18)

Figure 3 (19–30).


Ishida had in mind the joseki of Dia. 4 but he departed from the correct sequence by playing 19 before 21. Rin took advantage of this by playing 24. If Ishida now cut at 28, then Black 19 could easily become a bad stone. **Dia. 6** shows what we mean. Black ▲ is unnecessary for the life of the corner group, while White △ makes the black stones to the left unsteady. Without this unhealthy exchange Black could play **Dia. 7** to get eye shape.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Although Dia. 6 was a plausible way to play, Ishida preferred Black 25 in the figure, a move often seen in situations like this one. It gave him profit and left White with no way to make a base on the lower side. When White played the vital point at 26 Ishida played 27, making a pincer attack on White 24. Rin now very sensibly connected at 28. He did not defend White 24 because he could not make any territory by so doing, and in spite of his tenuki there was no way for Black to make a large capture on the lower side. When Black attacked at 29, White skipped lightly and naturally to 30.







Figure 3 (19– 30)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Dia. 8


Fujisawa Shuko, who was giving a running commentary on this game, said that Black 25 should have been played on the fourth line as in **Dia. 8**. Then White would not have been able to play 'e' after Black 3, but would have had to play 4 to escape. How the fighting would have gone after this and whether or not Black would have eventually been able to play 'e' himself are questions we cannot answer.

Black 29 was also questioned after the game. Some said that a more indirect attack, such as 'x' or 'y' in the figure, would have been better, but again this is a difficult matter. Black 29 was very natural.

We have spoken of White 26 as the vital point, and if the reader will refer to Dia. 6 he will see that it is in the same place as Black 1 there, but we have more to say about it. Why did Rin not make a more determined attack with 1 in **Dia. 9**? The trouble with this attack was that Black could play 2, limiting White to a small scale capture of the three stones, obtaining compensation by cutting off White △, and taking sente at 8 or some other point. All in all this would not be so good for White. White 1 in Dia. 10 was also rejected. Black could escape with 2 just as in the figure, and White would eventually be troubled by the aji of Black 'f'. White 26 was a beautiful play and we hope the reader appreciates it.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10





Figure 4 (31–43)


Figure 4 (31–43).

Rin had no fear of the hanekomi at 1 in **Dia. 11**. White 4 there is very hard on Black △. Black 5 to 15 are one possible continuation, and White can live on the lower edge by playing 'g', while the aji of White 'h' remains in the corner. Black has lost his territory and almost surely the game.

Since the hanekomi was no good, Ishida played Black 31. White 32 led to an empty triangle, which is said to be bad shape, but this was a case in which bad shape was better than no shape at all. If White had played 1 in **Dia. 12**, Black could have attacked at 2 and White would have been in real trouble. As it was, White 32 left Black no more severe an attack than 35, and White played 36 and 38, limiting the size of Black's corner and giving his own stones more shape. With White 36–42 Rin protected his weak group and was at last in a position to begin making territory. First, however, he had to suffer Ishida to play Black 43. This was truly a large point, limiting the territory White could get in front of his shimari, preparing a friendly reception for the black center group should it be chased across the board, and aiming to form a big moyo in conjunction with Black 'i'. In spite of all this, Ishida was about to lose control of the game.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12





Figure 5 (44–48)

Figure 5 (44–48).

Rin delivered three hard blows with 44, 46, and 48. White 44 chased the black center group, attacking with keima as the go proverb advises. White 46 forestalled Black 'i'. With White 48 an enormous moyo took shape on the left side. Ishida's center was hard pressed by these three moves, and he was now at a loss to know what to do. He did not like the prospect of 1, 3, and 5 in **Dia. 13**. It would be enough for White to answer with 2, 4, and 6, strengthening his right side moyo. The exchange of △ for ▲ in Dia. 13 is very bad for Black. If △ were played after 7, Black would answer, if at all, with 'j', not ▲, to form more territory. Not only that, but Rin might play 6 at 'k' and things would get complicated.



Dia. 13





Figure 6 (49–55)

Figure 6 (49–55).


After thinking for 56 minutes, Ishida played 49. Rin pressed with 50 and 52, preparing for an eventual invasion at 'm'. Ishida answered with 53, Rin played nozoki at 54, and Ishida played tobi at 55. The fight had become difficult, especially for Black.

Black could not afford to connect in answer to the nozoki at 54. If he played 1 in **Dia. 14**, White 2 would leave him with no satisfactory way to meet the threat of White 'p'. Perhaps he would play 'n', but then 'o' would be White's sente. Also 'q' would be a good kikashi for White later on.

Although White 2 in **Dia. 14** was the important point, Rin could not play there before playing the nozoki. Had he done so, Black could have made good shape with a bamboo joint as shown in **Dia. 15**.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15





Figure 7 (56–62)




Dia. 16


Figure 7 (56–62).

Rin played 56 and the fight became very tense. He could not play submissively at 1 in **Dia. 16**, giving Black time to play 2 and 4, for after that White 'r' would be answered by Black 's'. Black 57 and White 58 were natural, but Black 59 was not. Ishida thought for 36 minutes about this move. He was aiming at Black 'd', of course, but by provoking White 60 and 62 he caused himself great difficulties. Most other players felt that he should simply have connected at 1 in **Dia. 17**, giving up the cut at 'd'. Then White would have had to play 2 and Black 3 would have solved the problems of the center group. White 2 in **Dia. 18** is impossible.


With White 62 the time to adjourn for the night had come and Ishida was asked to choose his next move and record it. After another 41 minutes of thought he did so. We are going to spend some time reading out the situation at the end of




Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Dia. 19




Dia. 20

this figure, and we hope the reader will bear with us and try to appreciate the tight spot Ishida had got himself into.


To begin with, Black could not cut at 1 in **Dia. 19**. White 4 and 6 would capture three stones in sente and all of White's groups would be safe from attack.

Black 1 in **Dia. 20** is possible, but although this kosumi saves the three black stones it has no other effect, so when White pushes through at 2 Black is without adequate resources. If he plays 3, then White 4 threatens both 't' and 'u'. If he plays 3 in **Dia. 21**, then 4 strengthens the right side group. White has kikashi at 'q' and can aim to invade at 'm'.


Black 1 in **Dia. 22** is a better way to save the three stones. After pushing with 1 and 3 Black can successfully cut at 5, and White's right side group is thin. White 6 defends it, but Black makes a big two stone capture with 7–10, removing all bad aji in the lower right corner. This may seem a good way for Black, but in truth White 4 inflicts no small damage on him, enabling White to slide to 'v' in the future and making the lower left corner unsteady in other ways. It might actually be




Dia. 21



Dia. 22




Dia. 23




Dia. 24

better for Black to cut with 3, as in **Dia. 23**, even though this costs him his three stones. Also, both diagrams 22 and 23 end in Black's sente, so White might prefer to play 2 in **Dia. 24**. After White 6, Black must play 'q' to prevent White 'u', but then White can launch an attack with 'w'. None of diagrams 22–24 is very good for Black.


Ishida came to the conclusion that Black 1 in **Dia. 25** was the only good move. Note that unlike the other moves we have looked at so far it has an effect on the White stones on the left side, aiming at 'x' and other points as we shall see. However it does nothing to keep White from capturing the three stones with 2 and so on. In Dia. 25 White cannot play 'y' because of 'x', but he can play 'z' in sente and it is better for Black to play 5 at 6, as we shall see in the next figure. White cannot play 2 in **Dia. 26** instead of 4 in Dia. 25. Dia. 26 may be compared with Dia. 22, the only difference between the two being the exchange of ▲ for △. Since ▲ is a powerful stone and △ is almost worthless, this exchange amounts to a one move loss for White.




Dia. 25



Dia. 26




Dia. 27




Dia. 28

Do not think that there is any escape for Black's three stones after 2 in Dia. 25. If he plays keima watari on the lower edge with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 27** White will connect at 4, after which Black must succumb to a huge defeat in the center, the cut at 'a' being impossible.


Is White 2 in Dia. 25 the worst that Black has to fear? What about White 1 in **Dia. 28**? In spite of White 15 there, Black can cut through the white wall and attack the right side while having Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd' to make a second eye on the lower edge. Dia. 25 is better for White. Well then, what about White 1 in **Dia. 29**, or **Dia. 30**, or **Dia. 31**? None of these plays achieve any success for White, as the reader can see without any further explanation on our part, if he has not yet run out of patience. We shall now return to the actual game.



Dia. 29



Dia. 30



Dia. 31





Figure 8 (63–73)

Figure 8 (63–73).


After the foregoing lengthy discussion this figure is not hard to understand. Black 69 prevented 'z' from becoming White's sente, an important point when it came to reducing his left side territory. It also caused this figure to end in White's sente, as compared with Black's sente in Dia. 25, but the three black stones were not as dead as in Dia. 25.

What do we mean by this? What could Black do? Black 1 in **Dia. 32** looks like a tesuji, but it just does not work. White has a counter tesuji at 4. Black 1 in **Dia. 33** is what we mean. White must play 2 and then Black can play 3 and 5, but the semeai is won by White. Now Black can capture five stones by playing 'x', but White is not too sorry to give them up since they have lost their significance as cutting stones. Indeed their natural destiny has become to be captured by Black, for they are doing nothing at all for White.

This is what Rin read out at the time, but there was a mistake in his analysis. Instead of Black 9, there is a much more destructive play. Can the reader find it for himself before it is revealed on page 135? If so, he will realize that Black's three stones were by no means captured yet.



Dia. 32



Dia. 33
⑥ connects

Figure 9 (74–88).

After kikashi at 74 and 76, Rin left the lower side as it was and played White 78. The threat of White 'm' could not be ignored, and Ishida played 79. White 'm' was still possible, so when Rin played 80 Ishida hastened to defend at 81. Now that 'm' was impossible, Rin played 82–86, enlarging his side and reducing Black's corner in sente. Finally he played 88, removing one of the last weak points in his moyo.






Figure 9 (74–88)

After the game White 80 was widely criticized as being too cautious. White 'b' does look better, but Rin thought he could afford to play conservatively, and considering the subsequent course of the game we are not going to dispute his judgement. At this point he was far ahead.

After playing cautiously with 80, Rin was perhaps too greedy in playing 88. White 'c' would have been better shape. This would invite Black 'e', but the large moyo was more important than a few points in the corner.






Dia. 34

Figure 10 (89–93)


Figure 10 (89–93).

At any rate, the white moyo was getting bigger and bigger and so far Ishida had done nothing about it. He struck at last with Black 89, 91, and 93. It may seem that these three moves were played at random, but in fact they were well related to one another.


Black 89 and 91 threatened to live on the left side. If White played 1 and 3 in **Dia. 34**, then Black would be alive after 4 and 6, a fact which the reader may try to verify for himself. If White played 3 in **Dia. 35**, then the corner would become ko. Black would have an almost inexhaustible supply of ko threats on the left side and White would have to worry about the bad aji at 'f' and 'g'. Rin did not want to run the risk of losing his corner, for his left center was still open to Black 'h' and



Dia. 35



Dia. 36



Dia. 37

he might find himself with too little territory left to win the game. White 1 in **Dia. 36**, instead of 5 in Dia. 35, leads to a worse ko. If White 5 in Dia. 36 is played at 6, then Black 'j' lives.

Rin played 92 to prevent the sequences of the last three diagrams, moving on to a seemingly certain victory, but Black 93 gave him pause. Up to this point he had been playing a little faster than Ishida, but now he thought for 54 minutes before playing White 94. Black 'k' would join 93 to the main body, but if Rin played at 'k' himself as in **Dia. 37** he would be in trouble after Black 2. We leave the reader to explore the possibilities after Black 2 on his own, taking note of the usefulness of Black △.






Figure 11 (94–100)



Dia. 38



Dia. 39

Figure 11 (94–100).

At length Rin played 94. If Ishida now played 100 then White 'n' would leave the moyo almost intact, so after a well-timed kikashi at 95 he played 97. The significance of Black 95 will appear in the next figure.

After the game Rin criticized White 94 in spite of all the time he had spent on it. He said that White 1 in **Dia. 38** would have been more reasonable. Black 2 and 4 there come to nothing, and Black 3, White 2, Black 'p', White 5 would leave White enough territory to win with some to spare. Still, Ishida is very clever in such situations, and no one can be sure what would really have happened if Rin had played 1.

After White 98 Ishida had a chance to make an easy connection with 1 in **Dia. 39**, but this would have left White too much territory, so he played nobi at 99, allowing Rin to close the back door on him with 100. He had in mind an alternative escape route.






Figure 12 (101– 119)

Figure 12 (101–119).


Black 1, 3, and 5 were an excellent combination, making use of every stone that Ishida had played so far inside the white moyo. When he played at 7 Ishida had prospects for making his escape, but not before playing the tsuke at 9. White 10, which aimed at such points as 'q' and 'r', was a good reply, but Rin must have been sorry to see his opponent play 11, 13, 15, and 17 in sente. It was now apparent that White 'c' would have been better than △, for then White would have had a watari at 's'. Ishida played 19 and his group was almost safe.



Dia. 40



Dia. 41



Dia. 42

The last remaining danger was White 1 in **Dia. 40**. If Rin played this nozoki and Ishida connected at 2, then White 3 and 5 would deprive his group of eyes and keep it from connecting out to safety. A semeai between the black and white center groups would follow. If, instead of connecting, Ishida played 2 in **Dia. 41**, Rin could catch a couple of stones in sente, securing eye shape for his own group. Ishida could, however, play 2 in **Dia. 42** and escape without serious damage. After 6 the black group is alive.





Figure 13 (120– 143)

Figure 13 (120–143).

Rin considered the possibilities of the last three diagrams and decided to play White 20 and 22, letting Black get away without putting up a struggle. Ishida's invasion of the white moyo had been an almost unbelievable success. Without suffering any damage to his own territory he had driven clear through the once-great moyo, reducing it to about 35 points. Not only that, but White's center group was now just barely alive.

Before doing anything else Rin played 24, the most important yose point because it was sente for both sides. Then he played the long sequence from 26 to 43, keeping Black from making any territory at all in the center. In spite of his successful invasion, Ishida was still behind in the game.



Dia. 43

At the end of this figure Rin was in a position to continue on into Black's upper side with 1 in **Dia. 43**, but to do so would not have been profitable. Black 4 in Dia. 43 is absolute sente, and the loss on the upper side is only seven points. White cannot avoid a larger loss on the lower side for if he connects at 11, which is worth 13 points, Black plays 12, 14, and 16.






Figure 14 (144–152)
51 takes ko

Figure 14 (144–152).


From the last diagram we can see that White 44 was quite a large move. Now, however, Ishida played 45, 47, and 49 and Rin experienced a rude awakening. If he connected at 1 in **Dia. 44**, he would be finished off by Black 4, a tesuji which he had missed before. Did the reader find it? If Rin had realized the existence of this tesuji earlier, he would have played White 44 at 48 and this, as both players agreed after the game, would have clinched his victory. Now he was faced with a ko fight which endangered his entire right side group and the game was close.



Dia. 44





Dia. 45



Dia. 46

White 52 may not look like much of a ko threat, but Rin had no hope of winning the ko due to the endangered state of his right side stones. He played 52 to prevent Ishida from cutting at 'd', making two ko threats while capturing two stones. He hoped that Ishida would immediately finish the ko, giving him a chance to play 1 in **Dia. 45**, the vital point. Black 2 would be answered by White 3, attacking the lower right corner and reducing it to just two points, after which White could live with 15–21. Black 2 and White 3 in **Dia. 46** would be just as good, 't' and 'u' being White's sente.





Dia. 47

Figure 15 (153–165)

Figure 15 (153–165).

But Ishida played the vital point himself with 53 before finishing off the ko. Rin made a living shape with 54 and 56, but Black 57 was a large sente yose play. Rin could not have prevented it with 1 in **Dia. 47**, as Black 2 and 4 make clear.

Rin needed to add one more stone to his group to make it live, but before doing so he played kikashi at 58, 60, and 62. "Kikashi before living," is standard practice. White 64 was, Rin thought, the best way to defend his shape, but in fact it left some bad aji for Black to exploit later on. White 'v' or 'w' would have been better. In any case, Black's attack had come to an end, so at last he played 65.







Figure 16 (166–183)



Dia. 48



Dia. 49



Dia. 50

Figure 16 (166–183).

After sente yose at 66–74, Rin played White 76. This was the largest yose point—compare it with Black 'y'—but Ishida came up with a brilliant sequence of plays in 77–81. At the end of this figure Rin was faced with several unpleasant alternatives.

If he played 1 in **Dia. 48** Black would push out at 2, and if he played 3 his whole group would die. It should be clear that after Black 4, White cannot get two eyes. Note that Black cannot play 4 before 2. Black 4, White 2, Black 'a', White 'b', and White lives.

Instead of playing 3 in Dia. 48, White must bid farewell to three stones and play as in **Dia. 49**. He can partially make up for his loss by playing 5–10 in the lower right corner.

Note the importance of Black 83 in the figure. If it were omitted, then White could answer 1 in **Dia. 50** with 2, threatening to kill the corner. Black 3 is the correct defense, but now White can connect safely at 4 since he has an eye at 6.

Figure 17 (184–199).

Rin chose to play 84–88, letting Ishida take one stone at 89. This pon-nuki greatly enlarged his corner and gave him two extra points at 'p' and 'q' to boot. If we count carefully and compare this result with Dia. 49, we find the two to be almost exactly equal in profit. If anything, Dia. 49 might give White one more point than the figure.

The reader may wonder why Rin sacrificed White 84. This was in theory good yose technique. If he had played 1 in **Dia. 51**, Black could later have rescued his stone with 2, then played 4 and 6 to reduce White's territory to a minimum. Obviously Black 2 in Dia. 51 is more effective than Black 1 in **Dia. 52**, but in the circumstances of this game Black was destined to play neither of them and White 84 became a wasted sacrifice.

The reader may also wonder why White played 90 instead of drawing out his one stone, but this time Rin was making no mistake. **Dia. 53** is worse for him than the figure by two or three points. White 1 there only helps Black to play 4, which is the vital point.

White 98 was worth three points in sente. Why did Ishida play 97, which seems to be worth only one point, and not play 98 himself? The answer is White 1 in diagrams 54 and 55. **Dia. 54** is a tragedy for Black, and **Dia. 55**, though not so bad, costs him 3 or 4 points in sente.







Figure 17 (184–199)



Dia. 51
③ tenuki




Dia. 52




Dia. 53

Figure 18 (200–221).

White 200 and Black 1 were miai, each being worth four points. Just for the reader's reference we show **Dia. 56**, where these two points are reversed. Compared with the figure, White 1 in Dia. 56 has reduced Black's corner by three



Dia. 54



Dia. 55

points and Black 4 has done the same to White's side. White must play 'r' and perhaps 's' in Dia. 56, just as in the figure he has played 4 and perhaps will have to play 'q'. Actually Dia. 56 and the figure do not come out exactly the same. The figure is one point better for Black if he fills both ko.

White 10 and Black 21 were also miai, each being worth two points. If we count the territory at the end of this figure, taking note of White's sente yose at 'i', 'j', and 'k', observing that White must eventually fill at 'x', and assuming White 'm', Black 'n', White 'o', Black 'u', White 'p', (to avoid having to fill at 'q'), and White 't' we get:

	White		Black
Upper left	38	Upper side	28
Center	7	Lower side	33
Right	11		61
	56		

Remember, we are counting the stones Black has captured at 'u', 'v', and 'w'. We are not counting the stone he captured at 'y' because he lost a stone at △ and these two cancel. Similarly the various stones captured on the right edge cancel. White has captured one stone at 'z'.





Figure 18 (200–221)



Dia. 56

Since it was Rin's turn to move after 21 and he was behind by only half a point, counting komi, the reader may think he was going to win the game, but not so. Ishida had too many opportunities on the left side with 'm', 'o', etc.




Figure 19 (222–251)
㊼ connects at ㊷
㊿ connects below ㊽

Figure 19 (222–251).

After 22, 24, and 26 Rin made his final effort to win by playing White 28, but he had no chance. Ishida countered with 29, 31, and 33. Rin was by now in byo yomi, and he played 36, 38, and 40 to gain time to think. Ishida answered 42 with ko at 43. If he had connected at 'a' he would have lost by half a point. Rin did not have enough ko threats to win the ko fight, especially after wasting 36, 38, and 40, so he played 44, making 'b' and 'c' miai and gaining one point. He was troubled by damezumari in the lower left corner, for if he connected at 45 Black would play 'd'. Compared with our previous count Ishida had gained three points on the left side while Rin had gained two with 28 and 44, so at 11:36 p.m. on the second day Ishida came to win by $1\frac{1}{2}$ point.

This had been quite a game. Rin had overpowered his opponent in the fuseki, and in spite of Ishida's brilliant invasion of the left side and the ko Rin had failed to see on the lower side, it was not until fairly late in the yose, perhaps at 164, that he finally lost the game. Ishida returned to Tokyo in triumph, and a week later he scored another victory by beating Kajiwara in the first game of the Best Ten title series.

Time elapsed: White: 9 hrs. 59 min.
Black: 9 hrs. 57 min.

CHAPTER 11: The Third Game

For the third game of the Honinbo Sen the participants traveled to the Yuda hot spring resort in Yamaguchi. After the large scale fighting that had marked the fuseki and chuban of the first two games, Ishida decided to play conservatively this time, hoping to keep the game close and win in yose. He succeeded in the first part of his plan, but a serious mistake at the outset of the yose decided the result. This game was played on May 18 and 19.

Figure 1 (1–19).

Black 1, 3, and 5 have become the most common of all the opening patterns in recent years. White usually plays an immediate kakari at 'a' or 14 to prevent Black from making two shimari, but Ishida used White 6 to make a shimari of his own. He was ready to answer a black shimari in the upper left corner with another shimari in the lower right corner, making a ryo-jimari fuseki. Knowing that Ishida likes ryo-jimari, Rin played Black 7.




Figure 1 (1–19)


White answered with 8, a move which is coming to be seen fairly often and which merits a couple of diagrams in explanation. This ikken tobi is frequently played with the intention of answering the tsuke at 9 with the hane at White 1 in

Dia. 1. Black 2 to White 5 are standard, after which two different joseki exist. Black 6, 8, and 10 would be appropriate in this game. Black 1 in **Dia. 2** is more aggressive, but White 8 and 10 there work too well with the white shimari. Note that if Black 9 is omitted the corner dies.


Ishida, however, decided to play shita-hane at 10, which is also joseki. Comparing the figure with Dia. 1 we note that White's corner is smaller, but Black's position is looser and extends one line less toward the shimari in the upper right corner.

Now that Black's kakari in the lower right corner had been carried out it was White's turn in the upper left. The joseki played there is a very common one. Ishida was sticking close to the edge of the board, concentrating on making secure territory early in direct contrast to his strategy in the first two games.

At the end of this figure there were three large places to play, one on the left side, one on the lower side, and one on the right side. Which does the reader think was the most important, and which the least?



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (20–27).

Ishida decided that White 20, extending from his ogeima shimari, was the biggest point. Rin replied with Black 21, making territory in front of his kogeima shimari. White 22 was the smallest of the three oba. Due to the low position of △ and ▲ neither player could expect to make much out of the lower side with just one move. The main function of White 22 was to keep Black from making a double wing formation.





Figure 2 (20–27)

The right and left sides were miai, so how would it be if White played 1 in **Dia. 3** instead of 20? Black would play 2, and we are inclined to agree with Ishida that this diagram was not the best way. White needs to do something to prevent Black 'a', and he loses any chance to attack the lower right corner.

Now it was Rin's move. His next project was to invade the upper right but first he played kikashi at 23, strengthening his position in the rear before precipitating a battle at the front. Note that 23 might well have become a good point for White to take had Black not played there. Note also that even after White 24, Black still had 'a' to play, so White's territory on the lower side was not very much yet. Rin invaded at 25, and 26 and 27 were a natural continuation.

Black 23 in this game was a kikashi, but of course White was not forced to answer it. He could have played 'b' to protect his territory in the upper right, but then Black 'c' would have been very hard on him.



Dia. 3






Figure 3 (28–32)




Dia. 4

Figure 3 (28–32).


Ishida strengthened the corner with 28. This gave his opponent a chance to turn on him and attack with 29 and 31, but he was ready with two remarkable moves at 30 and 32. Instead of 28 the commonplace way for White to play would be the ikken tobi at 1 in **Dia. 4**, but then Black could play 2, 4, 6, and 8 to give shape to his running stones. White's running group looks rather forlorn by comparison.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Dia. 8


White 1 in **Dia. 5** is another ikken tobi which Ishida rejected as being too heavy. Here White 3 threatens 'a' but Black 4 defends, and after 8 Black's stones are strong while White's are weak. If Black can chase them toward the lower side he can make use of the motare attack at 'b'.

White 30 in the figure was a nimble move. Ishida was not afraid of Black 1 in **Dia. 6.** He would just play 2 and there would be no way for Black to keep up the attack.


After the game Rin praised White 28, 30, and 32 and said that he should have played differently to prevent them. To begin with, he said that the high uchikomi at 1 in **Dia. 7** would have been better. He envisioned the sequence shown, after which he could play 'c' to attack or 'd' to defend. He also said that he should have played 1 in **Dia. 8** instead of 31. This would have prevented White 32.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

How was he to answer White 32? The usually strong tachi at 1 in **Dia. 9** would swiftly lead to disaster. The sagari at 1 in **Dia. 10** is sometimes good, but not in this case. White would play hane at 2. Black would have to try the cut at 3, but it would not work. After White 12, Black would like to play 'e', but he is bothered by the bad aji of White 'f' and 'g'. The shita-hane at 1 in **Dia. 11** would also be bad. Black could connect underneath with 5 and 7, but White could cut at 8. At the end of this diagram White is in good fighting trim. See how White △ comes to be well placed. Black could play 5 at 9, but then White 5 would again give good shape. With 1 in diagrams 9, 10, and 11 eliminated Rin had little choice about his next move.






Figure 4 (33–41)




Dia. 12

Figure 4 (33–41).


Rin played ue-hane at 33, and the following plays led to a ko fight. Rin was now in difficulties, but he judged that what he played in this figure was the best he could do. He did not like the connection at 1 in **Dia. 12**, to replace Black 35. The sequence from White 2 to 16 is not hard to read out. Black's group in the lower right is going to give him some trouble, and his group in the upper right does not have eye shape yet either. White's upper right corner has suffered, but it is not in mortal danger because White has the tobi at 'a' to play if Black enters it.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Rin did not like the connection at 1 in **Dia. 13,** (to replace Black 39), either. In this diagram White makes good shape with 8 and 10. He has kikashi at 'b' and can always watari at 'c'. If Black 3 in Dia. 13 is replaced by 3 in **Dia. 14**, then White can fight with 4 and 6 and again Black's stones in the lower right corner become weak. If Black fails to defend at 7 in Dia. 13, playing 1 in **Dia. 15** instead, then a ko fight occurs. A ko fight occurred in the actual game, but it occurred without Black's giving White such good shape. Incidentally, this semeai could also become seki, (Black 5 at 6 for instance), but that would leave Black with two separated weak groups.






Figure 5 (42–61)
45 takes ko 54 takes ko
48 〃 〃 57 〃 〃
51 〃 〃 61 connects ko



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Figure 5 (42–61).

The ko fight occupied the twenty moves of this figure. Among the ko threats White 50 was a conservative move. Had Ishida played 1 in **Dia. 16**, the ko fight would have become much more difficult for both sides. On the one hand White would be threatening 'a', and on the other hand Black would have a ko threat at 'b', following which moves like Black 'c' would be more effective.

After Black 59 Ishida could have continued the ko fight. Black had some more ko threats on the lower side, but they were not so many and not so serious. **Dia. 17** shows what to expect. Still, Ishida felt uncertain about what would happen if he continued the ko, and he thought that 60 was good enough to put him in the lead. Even after Black 61, his stones on the right side had a simple escape route. Can the reader see it? Black 61, which Rin thought about for 28 minutes, was the sealed move ending the first day.






Figure 6 (62–71)



Dia. 18




Dia. 19


Figure 6 (62–71).

White 62 threatened a second ko fight, as shown in **Dia. 18** for example, and Ishida made a watari on the right side. The sabaki maneuvers he had begun with White 32 in Figure 3 had been a good success for him, the measure of that success being the solidification of the lower side position which was now radiating power in all directions. True, the territory in front of his ogeima shimari was mostly gone, but this was balanced by the weakness of Black's stones there which would be a source of profit to White later on.


Black 67 and White 68 were miai. If Black had attacked the upper left corner with 1 in **Dia. 19**, then White could have dug a big hole in his lower left corner with 2, 4, and 6. The reader will find another variation of this joseki in figure 2, chapter 13.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

After White 70, Rin would have liked to play at 1 in **Dia. 20**, a very large point, but he did not want to see White 2 there. This tsuke is a standard tactic. If Black answers it at 3, then White can play 4 and 6. With weak black stones to the right and left he is in a good position to attack.

Instead of playing 3 in Dia. 20, Black had better adopt the safer sequence shown in **Dia. 21.** This avoids any fight, but White is able to reduce Black's upper side territory effortlessly while building strength in the center. Diagrams 20 and 21 are similar to well known handicap joseki, and players who know the handicap joseki might expect Black to play osae at 1 in **Dia. 22** instead of atari at 5 in Dia. 21. Dia. 22, however, ends in a complete failure for Black.







Figure 7 (72–78)



Dia. 23



Dia. 24




Dia. 25


Figure 7 (72–78).

After kikashi at 72, Ishida played three strange moves on the upper side. He was trying to find some way to deal with the power Rin was getting in the center. If he made the common sense play at 1 in **Dia. 23**, Rin would have been pleased to play 2 and 4. Considering the possibility of Black 'a', he might get a lot of center territory this way.

White 74 was quite a clever move. If Black attacked with 1, 3, and 5 in **Dia. 24**, White could easily manage with the sequence up to 14. If he moved 5 in Dia. 24 to 1 in **Dia. 25**, White would have sente and could later play 'b' or 'c'. Rin did not care to be so generous, so he played 75 in the figure.




Dia. 26



Dia. 27

White 76 was another clever move, but it was questioned after the game. The general opinion was that Ishida should have followed **Dia. 26** instead, using 1 and 3 as kikashi before playing katatsuki at 7. After White 11, Black could attack at 'd', but there are enough weaknesses in the black stones to the left that White can almost surely find a way to escape.

With White 78 it seemed that Ishida was trying to repeat the success he had with a similar move on the right side. As before, Rin could not answer this tsuke by playing tachi. **Dia. 27** shows the reason. Please compare this diagram with Dia. 23. This time the ue-hane was no good either, as can be seen in **Dia. 28.**



Dia. 28





Figure 8 (79–83)

Figure 8 (79–83).

However the shita-hane, which was rejected in Dia. 11, now became a good choice. Rin played 79 and the sequence up to 83 was forced. Next Rin expected **Dia. 29**, but Ishida refused to be drawn into a fight.



Dia. 29

Figure 9 (84–100).

Ishida played 84, letting Rin make territory along the upper edge with the sequence up to 91. Ishida had succeeded in preventing Rin from making center territory, but this operation was a kind of failure for him since he had lost so much on the upper edge. It was not just that Black had made profit with 85 and 87, but also that 'k' was no longer sente for White. He had his eye on the weak black group, of course, but this group was not weak enough to die yet. If Ishida had been leading after his success on the right side, he had now lost his advantage and the game was dead even. Perhaps he was not unhappy, though, for he had sente and, after playing kikashi on the left edge, he took the last oba point at 98. Rin immediately answered with the tsuke at 99, lest Ishida do likewise by playing 'a'.







Figure 9 (84–100)



Dia. 30



Dia. 31



Dia. 32

Tsuke seems to be a theme running through this game. We have studied White 32 and White 78, so now let us look at Black 99, a standard tactic for gaining profit either on the edge or in the center. White 100 was, in this case, the only good reply. If Ishida greedily captured one stone with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 30**, Rin would make too much territory with 4 and 8. White 3 in **Dia. 31** avoids this, but it is pointless to sacrifice White 1 in this way. It is better to play 100 in the figure. White 1 and 3 in **Dia. 32** do very well in the center, but the loss on the edge is too large to suffer.





Figure 10 (101–111)


Figure 10 (101–111).

Rin played hasami-tsuke at 1, another standard tactic. If Ishida played 5 to capture one stone Black 2 would bring about the same result as in Dia. 30. White 1 in **Dia. 33** would be even worse, for then White would lose both in the center and


on the lower edge. More reasonable is White 1 in **Dia. 34**, but White has allowed himself to be pushed to the right. Compared with the figure he is at least four points worse off on the lower edge. **Dia. 35** shows another rejected sequence. White 1 there is correct and White 3 seems to gain a sure profit in sente, but the aji of Black 'a' is intolerably bad for White. Because of it he cannot now play 'b' as he did in the figure.



Dia. 33




Dia. 34




Dia. 35

The reason that Ishida could play 2 and 4 in the figure instead of following Dia. 34 was that Rin had to give way with the nobi at 7. He read out that he could not play 1 in **Dia. 36** to secure profit on the edge. White's nidan bane at 10 and 12 in that diagram leaves Black in a dangerous situation. He must cut at 13, capturing four white stones, but then White becomes powerful in sente and can attack the group in the upper right corner. After Dia. 36, White 1 in **Dia. 37** would be a death blow to the black stones there. Even after White 8 in the figure Rin was afraid for these stones, and so he played 9 and 11 to defend them.



Dia. 36
❺ connects



Dia. 37





Figure 11 (112–121)




Dia. 38

Figure 11 (112–121).


Ishida had sente and the fight in the lower left continued. He played nozoki at 12 and Rin cut through the keima at 13. The connection at 1 in **Dia. 38** was out of the question, for then White could erase Black's territory easily by playing 2. Indeed White 2 in Dia. 38 is such a good point that perhaps Ishida should have played there immediately, without playing the nozoki at all. Rin expected this and read out the sequence shown in **Dia. 39**. White would reduce Black's left side nicely in this way, but Black could get some compensation by playing 'a' on the right side, White would have to take care of a weak group in the center, and the game would be very close. **Dia. 40** shows another possible way for Black to fight.

Even after Black 13 in the figure Ishida had a chance to cut into the left side. He could have played 1 in **Dia. 41**, getting a result similar to Dia. 39. The only difference between Dia. 41 and Dia. 39 is the exchange of 2 for △, which is bad for White. Black 2 in **Dia. 42** instead of 2 in Dia. 41 does not work too well, for the black stones in the middle of the left side become weak.

After Black 15 Ishida had a chance to capture three black stones with 1 in




Dia. 39




Dia. 40


Dia. 43, but the sequence there leaves Black with too much territory in the center. He now had no choice but to play 16 and 18, which he could do in sente. His moves in this figure were a bit mild, but not necessarily bad. He had good aji left at 'b'.



Dia. 41



Dia. 42



Dia. 43

Figure 12 (122–131).

The middle game was now drawing to a close, and the fate of the game hung in balance on every move. Both Rin and Ishida played slowly during this figure. White 22 and 24 aimed at White 'b', and Rin played 25 to defend. He could not allow White 1 in **Dia. 44**. Due to the presence of White △△ Black 6 there is a doomed stone. On the other hand, Ishida decided that 1 would fail without these two stones. Ishida also decided against 1 in **Dia. 45**. This would be a fairly large kikashi, but then Black could play 6 after White 3 and 5, threatening to capture △.







Figure 12 (122–131)




Dia. 44




Dia. 45




Dia. 46




Dia. 47



Dia. 48
❹ tenuki



Dia. 49




Dia. 50


Now that the aji at 'b' was eliminated, Ishida attacked with 26 and 28 and Rin defended with 27 and 29. Rin could have played 1 in **Dia. 46** instead of 27, which would have come to about the same thing. With 30 and 31 the middle game had ended and the yose begun. Let us take stock of the situation and see where the large yose points were and what they were worth.

One was obvious in the lower left corner. By comparing **Dia. 47** and **Dia. 48** we see that this was a twelve point gote yose.


There was another large play in the upper left corner. If White played 1 in **Dia. 49**, then his territory on the left side would become 14 points, assuming White 'a' and Black 'b'. He would probably get to play 'c' later. If Black played 1 in **Dia. 50**, White 2 and Black 3 would be the correct sequence. This result is harder to count than the previous one because a fairly large point at 'd' remains. If White plays 'd', then his territory becomes 9 points. If Black plays it, as in **Dia. 51**, then White's territory shrinks to 6 points and Black can make further profit with 'e'. If we take a result halfway between Dia. 51 and White 'd' in Dia. 50, we are inclined to say that White has lost 7 points and Black has gained 5 as compared with Dia. 49, so we count this yose as 12 points in gote.



Dia. 51
② tenuki




Dia. 52




Dia. 53

This means that the lower left and upper left corners were miai, and it was inevitable that Black would get one of them and White the other. There was, however, a clever way for Black to make a one point profit out of the two of them. He could play 1 in **Dia. 52** as kikashi, then go to the lower left corner. White's upper left territory is now only 13 points instead of the 14 in Dia. 49 due to his having had to play 2 instead of 'a'.

White 1 in **Dia. 53** was another large point. Black would play 2 so as to be able to hane at 'f' later, but then White could play 3, 7, and 9 in sente.



Dia. 54



Dia. 55

The largest yose, however, was in the center. White 1 in **Dia. 54** was the vital point, and if Black answered at 2 then White should continue at 3. These plays greatly increase his center territory while greatly reducing Black's. The yose would continue as shown, and after Black 14 White could play **'g'** to carry out the sequence of the previous diagram. If this happened we would count:

White		Black	
Upper left	13	Upper side	18
Upper right	16	Left	41
Lower side	29	Right	13
Center	7		72
	65		

White would be a little behind, but it would be his move and he might be able to catch up.

To appreciate the value of White 1 in Dia. 54, see what happens when Black plays there. Black 1 and 3 in **Dia. 55** inflict a great loss on White in sente, and later maybe Black can continue to push with **'h'.**




Figure 13 (132–147)

Figure 13 (132–147).

At this point Ishida erred. The one point Black gains in Dia. 52 must have loomed in his mind for he played 32, neglecting the center. Rin thus got the vital point in the center at 35. White 36 was a better reply than the one we showed in Dia. 55, but the damage was done and Rin was able to balance 32 with 39. When he made the five point gyaku yose play at 47 the game was decided.





Figure 14 (148–168)

Figure 14 (148–168).

Rin could not afford to answer White 48 with 1 in **Dia. 56** because of the peril to his center group, but he could easily afford to play 49, giving up one stone. He had to do this immediately because 49 would have been sente for White. Rin was now playing fairly rapidly, confident of winning, and Ishida was playing even more rapidly because he was running short of time. The reader should have little trouble understanding the plays of this figure.



Dia. 56

Figure 15 (169–195).

Black 69, White 76, and Black 79 were the largest remaining yose points. After these the lower right corner was the last matter of concern. Let us take a moment to read out the situation there.







Figure 15 (169–195)



Dia. 57



Dia. 58



Dia. 59

White can play sente yose with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 57,** or he can play a larger gote yose in **Dia. 58**. The reader should have no trouble seeing why Black cannot answer 1 in Dia. 58 with 3 or 5. Comparing Dia. 58 with **Dia. 59,** we see that this was a 5 point gote yose.

After Black 85, White 1 in Dia. 58 was the largest point, but Ishida realized that even if he played there he would lose the game, perhaps by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points. For once we leave the reader to verify this fact by counting the board for himself. Ishida played 86, giving Rin a chance to end the game by playing 93. Rin coyly played 89 instead, waiting to see what device Ishida would try in the lower right corner. Ishida tried the cut at 92 and atari at 94. If Rin connected at 90 a ko fight would take place and he would lose the game, but Black 95 brought about the same result as in Dia. 57. Does the reader see that White 92 and 94 were captured outright by this play? Ishida now resigned.

He avenged this defeat a few days later in the second game of the Best Ten tournament. In that game it was Kajiwara who made a mistake in the early yose, and Ishida won by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points, taking a commanding 2–0 lead in the series. At least one title seemed to be on the way for him.

Time elapsed: White: 9 hrs. 59 min.
Black: 9 hrs. 5 min.

CHAPTER 12: The Fourth Game

The fourth game was played on May 31st and June 1st at the Nagoya Castle Hotel in Nagoya. Rin had shown his usual power and steadiness in the first three games, so it came as a mild surprise when Ishida crushed him in the fourth game. Let's see how this happened.

Figure 1 (1–11).

Ishida played diagonal komoku and hoshi with 1 and 3 and Rin followed suit with 2 and 4. These plays do not look particularly remarkable, but in fact they fail to correspond to any of the established fuseki patterns. This meant that the players had no past experience to rely upon in choosing the joseki to use in the various corners. White 6 began the well known tsuke-hiki joseki, but Ishida chose an unusual variation when he answered Rin's nozoki at 10 by playing 11 instead of connecting.

Black 11 was not, of course, unknown, and the joseki books show this move with two possibilities to follow. In **Dia. 1** White simply cuts and takes a large, secure corner. Black ends in sente but is left with a serious defect in the cutting point at 'a', and this variation is said to be a little unfavorable to him. In the present game, however, Black had a stone in the upper right corner so he could make some kind of shimari there to form a good, large moyo on the right side.

In **Dia. 2** we see the second variation, which is suitable for reducing a black moyo on the right side.






Figure 1 (1–11)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Figure 2 (12–24)



Dia. 3


Figure 2 (12–24).

Rather than commit himself immediately to either Dia. 1 or Dia. 2 Rin decided to play a kakari at 12 and see how his opponent would respond. Ishida chose the simple kosumi at 13. Now Dia. 2 would have been appropriate, but instead of preventing his opponent from forming territory Rin built some of his own with 14. Ishida thought awhile about Black 15. Black 'a' looked better, but it would have left 'b' for White's future use. Rin played 16 to keep Black from attacking the corner and building a moyo on the lower side, and now all eyes turned to the large open space on the right side. Ishida had to defend it in some way, for if he let White make an invasion then Black 13 and 15 would become fruitless.


Black 17 was an interesting probing move. Ishida's plan was to test his opponent's reaction to this probe and defend his territory accordingly. If White reacted with 1 in **Dia. 3**, he would push at 2 and 4, then defend at 6. Rin didn't want to help build up the black territory in this way, so he chose White 18.

The reader should know that there was some bad aji for White after 18. Mainly there was Black 1 etc. in **Dia. 4**. Black could enlarge his corner to more than 20 points at White's expense, but to do so immediately would have been questionable. After 16 and 18 in Dia. 4 White could either invade the right side or form a huge moyo in front of his wall, and Black could not prevent both of these things. Ishida first defended his side with 19, planning to follow with Dia. 4. Rin naturally defended at 20. He could still have played tsuke as in **Dia. 5**, but he didn't want to do anything to strengthen Black's large territory. Compare Diagrams 3 and 5 and you will see that while Black ▲ in Dia. 5 may not be in quite the best place, White △ is ridiculous.

Black had defended his territory in sente, and he now played a kakari at 21. Considering White's strong position on the upper right, 22 was a good response. The standard ikken tobi at 'c' would leave White open to a 3–3 point invasion, while after 22 there was no such good point for Black anywhere on the upper side.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5






Figure 3 (25–36)

Figure 3 (25–36).


The choice of joseki is always difficult. Ishida played tsuke-osae in the lower left, defending the corner, but we shall just mention two of the alternatives he rejected. In **Dia. 6** Black 1 is a standard procedure in conjunction with ▲, but in this case White had some strength on the lower right and could counterattack with 2 and 4. The tsuke-nobi joseki was another alternative. It is almost never seen in professional games except in answer to a double kakari, but that does not mean it was out of the question. In present circumstances the variation shown in **Dia. 7** would probably be played. The reader can compare this diagram with the figure and draw his own conclusions.




Dia. 6




Dia. 7




Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

The tsuke-osae joseki has several variations. Instead of White 30, for instance, there is White 1 in **Dia. 8**. Black would answer at 2, aiming to play 'a' later. Instead of White 31 the standard variation is the cut at 1 in **Dia. 9**. Black's territory in that diagram becomes very large, although there is the bad aji of White 'b' which must be answered by Black 'c'. Instead of Black 3 in Dia. 9, there is also Black 1 in **Dia. 10**, which builds up to a large scale fight. We shall not try to say which of diagrams 9 and 10 is the better, or whether either of them is better than Black 31 in the figure, but we want the reader to know of these variations.

After the game Rin expressed the firm opinion that White 34 was a bad move. The vital point was 35, and he should have played there himself. See how Black 35 simultaneously swelled the right side territory and threatened White's lower side. Rin played 34 to prevent the easy invasion shown in **Dia. 11** but 35 was more important. After Black 35 he needed to defend his territory again, at 'd' in figure 3, but he felt that that would leave him behind so he invaded at 36.






Figure 4 (37–51)



Dia. 12



Dia. 13


Figure 4 (37–51).

Ishida had no regrets about losing one stone when he played 37. He could afford to take a minor loss in the upper left because he was planning to inflict a major loss on White by invading the lower side, and this he did after White 38.


Note that White 38 was played not to capture the lone black stone but to expand the upper side moyo.

The invasion of the lower side was a great success. When Ishida played 51 to capture one white stone, the game was already turning in his favor. White 34 in the previous figure was partly to blame for this, and perhaps White 40 was too. White might better have answered Black's invasion less directly with the hasami-tsuke at 1 in **Dia. 12**. If Black answered at 2, then White could defend at 3, preparing to give chase to the invading stone, and by chasing it, in some way to enlarge his territory on the upper side. Instead of answering at 2, Black might play the tsuke at 1 in **Dia. 13**. Black 5 would capture two stones in sente but White would be in an even better position to attack Black △.

The reader may wonder about White 42, for by playing tachi at 1 in **Dia. 14** White could have kept Black from escaping. Unfortunately Black could have lived on the lower side with the keima at 8 and the sagari at 12. White could not answer Black 8 in Dia. 14 with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 15**. These moves would take away Black's room for two eyes, but Black could cut in sente with 4, 6, and 8. After Black 14 'a' and 'b' are miai and White is lost.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15




Figure 5 (52–68)


Figure 5 (57–68)

White 54 was a doubtful move. The ordinary way would be simply to play 'e', chasing Black's weak group and reducing his territory on the right. Of course White 'e' was still possible after Black 55, so Ishida played a thick move at 57 to eliminate the bad aji. White 56 and 58 completed the capture of Black's isolated stone, but White had used six stones to get it. White 62 aimed at 'f', but Black 63 protected against that threat while threatening Black 'g'.


Now it seemed appropriate for Rin to defend his big moyo in some way, but after suffering the loss on the lower side he could not see how to defend enough territory to win, so he played 64, a large move, challenging Ishida to enter the moyo and risk a fight. Ishida accepted the challenge without hesitation, going in very deeply at 65.

White 66 and 68 were the proper attacking combination. If White played 1 in **Dia. 16**, Black could play 2 and 4, then extend to 6. White 'a' would be answered by Black 'b', 'c' would be Black's sente, and Black would have good prospects for an easy life.

White 68 was the vital point for attacking. What was Black to do? If he pressed with 1 in **Dia. 17** White would play 2, and Black would be unable to get any kind of eye shape on the upper side.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17






Figure 6 (69–76)

Figure 6 (69–76)

Ishida first played kikashi at 69, 71, and 73, then played kake at 75. He had to think about two possible answers to White 76. One was the osae at 1 in **Dia. 18.** White would push out at 2 and cut at 4, (or 7), capturing the three black stones on the left. Black would have at most one eye on the upper side and would have to run out into the center at 'a', hoping to make a second eye somehow. The other answer was the tusnagi at 1 in **Dia. 19**, but after the atekomi at White 4 Black would have no eye shape at all. Please check that if Black connects at 'b', White can play 'c'.



Dia. 18



Dia. 19





Figure 7 (77– 92)

Figure 7 (77–92).


Before launching into either Dia. 18 or Dia. 19 Ishida probed with Black 77. If Rin answered with 1 in **Dia. 20** then the tsunagi would become a good move. After 10 in that diagram, Black can live easily in the corner. Black 81 was the sealed move ending the first day's action.

Next morning Rin returned to the game with hopes of exploiting the weak black group which seemed about to stumble out into the center, groping for life. On seeing Black 81 he played 82 without even pausing to think. It was a mistake. Ishida went into action with 83, and after White 92 it was clear that he had brought about a big ko fight, which he could win. The black group did not have to grope for eyes after all and White's territory was almost all gone. If the reader can not read out how this ko fight arises, he should peek ahead to the next figure.

White 82 and 92 were both mistakes, as we shall explain. Rin would have liked to play 1 in **Dia. 21** to prevent the ko fight, but he was afraid that Black would come running out with 2, 4, and 6. Now we see why White △ was a mistake. If this stone had been played at 'd' White could keep up the pressure with 'e' and run the black stones to earth, but as it stands Black gets four liberties, which puts him a move ahead in the semeai.




Dia. 20




Dia. 21

But in truth Dia. 21 is a catastrophe for Black. After 6 in that diagram White can play 1 and 3 in **Dia. 22**, capturing Black's entire invading force. Rin failed to see this, and so he made his second mistake by playing 92 instead of 1 in Dia. 21.

Dia. 23 gives the correct interpretation of the situation. After White 1, Black has to play 2, (or 4), preventing Dia. 22 and thus threatening Dia. 21. White must play 3, and Black plays 4. This exchange, which greatly helps Black to live, would be unnecessary if White △ were correctly played at 'd'. Now White 'f' is not such a serious threat, but at least White has 33 points in the upper left corner and the game is reasonably close.



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

Figure 8 (93–100).

When he brought about this ko fight Ishida became confident of winning the game, for he had lots of ko ammunition in the lower right corner. Rin's failure to play **Dia. 23** had been a decisive mistake. We have no explanation for White 98, which wasted one potential ko threat.




Figure 8 (93–100)




Figure 9 (101–127)

④ takes ko ⑯ takes ko

❼ 〃 〃 ⑲ 〃 〃


⑩ 〃 〃 ㉒ 〃 〃

⓭ 〃 〃 ㉕ 〃 〃


Figure 9 (101–127).


White did not have so many large ko threats and Ishida patiently waited for one to come around which he could afford to ignore. Black 5 gave him ample resources in this ko fight, for White's corner was only just able to live. Incidentally, if Rin had played 1 in **Dia. 24** instead of 6 in the figure Black could have made a second ko shape with 2 and 4. White couldn't win two ko fights at once, so he would have to connect at 5 and Black would live in the corner while making about ten ko-threats there.

The ko fight ended when Ishida ignored White 26. He had come out on top, even though White could capture his three-stone pillar on the left side.



Dia. 24






Dia. 25


Figure 10 (128–145)
㉚ connects

Figure 10 (128–145).

Rin took one stone at 28, then connected at 30. He could instead have played kosumi at 1 in **Dia. 25** to capture the three black stones, but that would not have been enough to make up for the destruction of his upper side moyo. His only hope lay in making a larger scale capture of the three stones. If the reader is in doubt, let him play out the moves of Dia. 25 and count the board.

Ishida thought for 6 minutes, decided he could get his stones to safety, and played 31. The carefully played sequence of this figure did indeed end in his escape.





Dia. 26

Figure 11 (146–166)

Figure 11 (146–166).

Rin could not have played 50 at 'h' to cut, because Black 51 followed by Black 'i' would have captured his center stones. Poor Rin Kai Ho was only falling farther and farther behind as Black took profit first in the lower right corner and then in the upper right. White 64, which aimed at cutting with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 26,** was his last chance.




Figure 12 (167–183)
㊽ retakes

Figure 12 (167–183).

In the final throes of the game Rin succeeded in cutting off and attacking Black's entire center group, but Ishida had no trouble making it live. Black 81 made one eye and threatened Black 82, which would allow him either to make a second eye on the left edge or to connect to the lower left corner. When Ishida played 83 Rin resigned. It was only three o'clock in the afternoon. Rin had felt behind in this game ever since Black 35 the day before. Ishida had outfought him at every step, and although this victory only gave him a tie, it was so one-sided that the go world began to predict his triumph in the best of seven series.

Apparently the strain was beginning to tell, however, for in the next game of the Best Ten tournament Ishida made an unheard-of slip. He took a ko without making a ko threat and so lost by default, the first time this had ever happened in a professional tournament.

Time elapsed: White: 7 hrs. 7 min.
Black: 5 hrs. 57 min.

CHAPTER 13: The Fifth Game

With the score tied at 2–2, the go world anxiously awaited the outcome of the fifth game. It had not gone unnoticed that Black had won each of the first four games, and mutterings about "invincible sente" were being heard. At the same time Rin had looked bad in the last game, and if Ishida could do in this game as he had done in that one he would win, white stones or no. The Mainichi Newspaper arranged to play this game in the Ginrin So, an inn in Otaru in the north of Japan, on June 10 and 11. Ishida came to it sporting a modest growth of beard. **Figure 1 (1–25).**

The fuseki of this game was reminiscent of the third game of the series. As before, Ishida made a shimari with 6 and Rin, shunning ryo-jimari fuseki, played ikken takagakari at 7. As before, Rin developed a large area on the lower left and Ishida extended towards it along the lower side.

When Rin went to the left side with Black 19 Ishida had a chance to attack the lower right corner with 1 in **Dia. 1**, but he decided to play simply White 20 instead. The effectiveness of White 1 in Dia. 1 is reduced by Black △. Black 21 was the correct point for Black to defend. He had to play on the fourth line. If he had played 1 in **Dia. 2**, which in other circumstances is joseki, he would have been pressed into an intolerably low position on the right side by White 2 and the rest. At the end of this figure Rin probed at 25 and the middle game began.






Figure 1 (1–25)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Figure 2 (26–51)

Figure 2 (26–51).


As the reader probably knows, there are several ways to answer Black 25 in Figure 1. The idea behind White 26 is to prevent Black from playing lightly and to encourage him to go for a small life in the corner, leaving White strong on the outside. The joseki sequence from Black 27 to White 40 was discovered by Shimamura, 9-dan. It enables Black to develop on the outside after all.

One variation is possible in this joseki. Instead of White 23, White can play 1 in **Dia. 3**. After the game Ishida said he wished he had followed that diagram, attacking with 3 and 5.


White 30 is a must. White cannot afford to play **Dia. 4** even though it is simpler. In that diagram 'a' is Black's sente and White's gote and Black has a large life in the corner. On the other hand Black cannot afford to play **Dia. 5**. Then White can play 'a' in sente, or leave the corner for a while and wait for a chance to play 'b' and start a ko fight.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4




Dia. 5



Dia. 6
⑧ at △
❾ captures it
⓫ connects



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

White 36 seems to offer Black a two stone sacrifice, but Black must not accept the offer. The reason is shown in **Dia. 6**. The reader can verify that White's tactics there could not be accomplished without the sagari at 36.

After White 40 the joseki does not follow a set course. Rin played hana-tsuke at 41, and Ishida responded at 42. He decided that **Dia. 7** would leave his stones on the upper right too weak.

After White 42 Rin could have left 41 as kikashi and played 1 in **Dia. 8**. White might then play 2, leaving 3 and 4 as miai. In Dia. 8 Black cannot watari at 'c' because of White's kikashi at 'd', and the fighting is liable to be difficult. Maybe Black should play 4 instead of 3. At any rate he still has aji at 'e'.

Black 51 was a large and stubborn play, but perhaps it was a bit heavy. After the game Rin said that he should have followed **Dia. 9**, connecting his weak group to safety and preparing to build on a large scale in the center.



Dia. 9




Figure 3 (52–72)

Figure 3 (52–72).

Rin played another heavy move at 53, but Ishida could see no good way to attack the black stones directly, so he played White 54 to start a complicated fight. Rin attacked in a roundabout but effective fashion with Black 55, 57, and 59. White 62 aimed at 'f' and Ishida, after 46 minutes of thought, sealed White 64 as the last move of the first day. Next morning he cut at 66, and by the end of this figure he seemed to have compensated for his territorial loss on the upper side by bringing the black stones on the left side, as well as those in the center, under fire.






Figure 4 (73–89)




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Figure 4 (73–89).

Rin defended the left side with 73 and 75, and Ishida made some reasonable plays on the right with 78–84. With Black 85, however, the tables had somehow gotten turned and now it was Black who was attacking in the center. Ishida tried to defend with 86 and 88, but Black 89 had him in real trouble. After the game he said that he should have played 'g' instead of 88. He was afraid to play there now because of the large-scale attack shown in **Dia. 10**. There was also a second way for Rin to play if White played 1, as shown in **Dia. 11**. This would get Black's center group out of trouble for the rest of the game.







Dia. 12

Figure 5 (90–100)


Figure 5 (90–100).

Ishida played 90, threatening to make 1 in diagrams 10 and 11 work. Rin naturally took this point himself with 91, and after playing kikashi with 92–98 Ishida captured at 100. Black could still cut off White's center group with 1 in **Dia. 12**, but with the kikashi he had played White could live easily, in sente because Black would have to live on the left side after White 12.





Dia. 13



Dia. 14

Figure 6 (101–115)

Figure 6 (101–115).

Rin could not kill White's loose center group, but he took the lead by playing Black 1. Ishida could not answer with 1 in **Dia. 13**. Because of the presence of Black △ it would no longer be possible to live as in Dia. 12, and White 1 would just be captured and go to waste. White 2 in the figure was necessary and Rin took a big territory on the left side with 3.

The fighting up to this point had been so difficult that each player had less than two hours left on his clock. White 4 was an important thick move, preparing to attack Black's center with 'h', but Black 5 was extremely large. Ishida thought that he could still invade the right side at 6, but Rin skillfully defended with 7–13. Black 7 looks submissive, but it turned out to be a strong move. If Rin had played 1 in **Dia. 14** Ishida could have caused all sorts of trouble with 2.






Figure 7 (116–132)



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

Figure 7 (116–132).

Ishida played 16, permitting Black to connect with 19. He could not have persisted as in **Dia. 15** for he would then have lost all. The battle on the right side ended with Black 25. It had consumed most of the players' remaining time. Rin found himself in possession of two big territories, one on each side of the board, and a definite lead.

White 26 and 28 were what Ishida was aiming at when he played 4 in the last figure. Rin could not answer 26 with 1 in **Dia. 16** because White 6 there would cut off his center group. After he defended it White could play 'i' and capture four black stones in ko. Ishida ended this figure with a probe at 32.

Figure 8 (133–152).

Rin played 33, refusing to give in an inch. White 34 to Black 49 were kikashi and responses, and Ishida could see no legitimate chance for himself to win. There was a large point at 'j' on the upper side, but to make the game even close he would have to take it and also make a large territory in the lower right center, and he could not do both things at once. Perhaps he would have to resign soon, but before doing so he had one or two tricks to try. He played 50.

White 50 looked funny, and it put Rin on his guard. This play did not gain White anything on the right side. Of course it threatened to break through there, but if Black defended at 'k' he could next play atari against 50, and if anything White 50 caused White to lose a couple of points. It must, therefore, have been some kind of threat against Black's center group. Rin had only ten minutes of time left in which to decide how to deal with this unexpected move. After considering awhile, he thought he saw a way to defend his right side in sente and he played 51.

Rin should have played 'k', or 1 in **Dia. 17**. He could answer White 2 with Black 3 and live in the sequence up to Black 15. White might attack in some way other than with 4, but there was no way for him to kill the center group. At the end of Dia. 17 Black has a good ten point lead, even allowing for White's sente, as the reader can easily see for himself.

White 50 did not really threaten the center group, but White 52 did and although Rin did not yet realize it, he was now in trouble.





Figure 8 (133–152)



Dia. 17

Figure 9 (153–170).

When Rin played Black 59, connecting his center group to the lower side, he thought that he had taken away Ishida's last chance to win. He had already read out 62–69 on the right side. He had thought that this sequence preserved his territory in perfect safety. He had not seen the combination of these plays with 60 and 70. If he had, he would not have wasted a ko threat by playing 53, and he might have played 63 at 'm' which would have made the game close.




Figure 9 (153–170)




Figure 10 (171–193)
⑦⑥ takes ko ⑧⑦ connects
⑦⑨ 〃 〃 ⑧⑧ takes ko
⑧② 〃 〃 ⑨① 〃 〃
⑧⑤ 〃 〃 ⑨③ connects

Figure 10 (171–193).

All of Rin's hard work and beautiful play in the foregoing part of the game was cancelled by this ko fight. It was a one-play yose ko, that is White would have to ignore two ko threats to win it while Black would have to ignore only one, but that did not mean that Black was safe. When Rin decided to ignore White 92 he still had ko threats at 'n' and 'o', but Ishida had 'p', 'q', 'r', and a good many more against the center group. Sooner or later Rin would have to risk that group's life or lose the ko and the game.




Figure 11 (194–200)

Figure 11 (194–200).

Ishida had no trouble killing the black group. At the end of this figure Black can make one eye by capturing three stones at 's' but then White will play 't' and there is no chance for a second eye. Black 'u' is answered by White 'v' and 'w'.




Figure 12 (201–218)
⑫ at △

Figure 12 (201–218).

Rin resigned on seeing White 18. He had not been beaten by his hirsute opponent. He had not been outfought or overpowered. He had been led into a self-deception and he felt terrible. One short hour before he had been well on his way to a fourth Honinbo title. Now it was Ishida who was on top, three games to two.

There is some justice in the fact that Ishida lost his next game in the Best Ten tournament in the same way that he won this one. Leading by ten points after a big ko fight, he reached for a little more profit that Kajiwara seemed to be offering him on one side of the board and lost a big group on the other side. That title match now was tied at 2–2.

Time elapsed: White: 9 hrs. 56 min.
Black: 9 hrs. 59 min.

CHAPTER 14: The Sixth Game

The sixth and last game of the 26th Honinbo Sen was played on June 21 and 22 at the Seikoen Hotel in Atami, a town on the east coast of Japan about 75 kilometers south of Tokyo. Leading 3–2 after his victory in the fifth game, Ishida had a considerable psychological advantage. Rin's hopes of remaining Honinbo were not very high now.






Figure 1 (1–10)

Figure 1 (1–10).

Ishida played parallel hoshi with 1 and 3, as he had in his last game in the Honinbo League. Then he played the nadare joseki in the upper left hand corner. The moves of this figure follow one of the standard fuseki patterns, and a common way to continue is shown in **Dia. 1**. That is how the first game of the previous year's Honinbo Sen, in which Rin, (White), defeated Sakata, developed. White 2 makes the corner solid, but Black 1 and 3 are large points and White is hindered from extending to 'a'.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (11–32)

Figure 2 (11–32).


Ishida, however, preferred to carry on with the onadare joseki. Nowadays the sequence up to Black 31 is considered the standard variation of this joseki, although the other variations have not been abandoned. When Rin and Ishida had met in the Best Ten tournament three months before, Rin had played White 1 in **Dia. 2** instead of 'a'. That variation gives Black the corner and sente, which Ishida used as shown, but White has the outside and can later play kikashi at 'b' or 'c'.

If Dia. 2 is joseki, then we can understand why Black always cuts at 17 in the figure before playing 19. If he reverses the order and plays as in **Dia. 3**, then White will answer the cut at 3 with the tachi at 4. Proceeding as shown up to White 14, the only difference between this diagram and the last is the exchange of Black 1 for White △. This exchange is unfavorble to Black. In Dia. 2 he had a yose play at 'a', while in Dia. 3 his yose play is at 'd' and gets him two points less. It is for these two points in the corner that Dia. 3 is rejected by professional players.


Returning to the game at hand, Black's three stones in the corner were captured but there was lots of aji left. To begin with, Black had 1, 3, and 5 in **Dia. 4** which reduce White's corner profit to ten points or so. Black 5 is also important for the eye shape of the black group on the left side. Black should not, however, play these moves at once because there is other aji to consider. In **Dia. 5** we see Black playing to produce a double ko. He cannot win the semeai this way, but he can use the double ko as an unlimited source of ko threats. If White dislikes this he can play 4 at 6, but then Black 4 produces a 1-play yose ko.

Nor is this all. In **Dia. 6**, which is taken from a game between Sakata and Takagawa, we see another kind of aji at work. Takagawa had just played ▲, apparently cutting White's position in two. White played 1, threatening to follow with 'g' and win the semeai. After White 9, 'e' and 'f' were White's sente, his position was connected, and Black ▲ turned out to be a futile play.


So much for the aji in the corner. Let us briefly mention White 32 in the figure, which is one of the common ways to continue from the onadare joseki. White 1 in **Dia. 7** was an alternative. Ishida was planning to answer at 2, although other players might choose Black 'h' or 'i'. When Rin failed to play 1 in Dia. 7, Black had a chance to attack by taking that point himself. **Dia. 8** could be considered after Figure 2.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Figure 3 (33–41).

Instead of following Dia. 8, Ishida calmly played an ikken tobi at 33, and then another at 39. When he played Black 41 the course of this game was becoming clear. White would get territory along the upper side, but Black would chase White's central group, hoping to establish a large territory on the right side and perhaps to gain profit in other directions as well.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8






Figure 3 (33–41)


The combination of White 34 and 36 is worthy of some explanation. With these two plays Rin threatened a nozoki at 1 in **Dia.9**. If Black connects at 2 in that diagram White can capture four of his stones, so he must play 2 in **Dia. 10**, but that also turns out badly for him. After White 7 a cut at 'a' can be answered by White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'. Therefore Ishida had to defend. After Black 37 the nozoki was still possible but no longer threatening, as you can see in **Dia. 11** where White 1, 3, and 5 just help Black. Rin treated White 34 as a kikashi, abandoning it after using it to help his center group move.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11





Figure 4 (42–51)


Fgure 4 (42–51).

Rin played kikashi at 42, then continued to extend his upper side territory to the right with 44. Ishida probed at 45 and 47, then continued his attack on the center. The sequence from 45 to 50 seems innocent enough, but if we look deeply we can see all sorts of remarkable possibilities passing by as these moves were played.


A niken biraki on the fourth 1ine is always somewhat thin. After Black 45 and White 46 Black could cross-cut with 1 in **Dia. 12.** If White captured at 2, then Black would play atari at 3, hiki at 5, and keima at 7. Black 5 and 7 pave the way for a fierce attack on the center, but if White defends the center Black can take sente and play the sequence shown in **Dia. 13**. The result of Dia. 12 is good for Black.




Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14




Dia. 15

Incidentally, Black 5 in Dia. 12 is correct. Black 1 in **Dia. 14** would be too greedy. While Black made a little territory on the upper side White could completely turn the tables on him in the center.


Since Dia. 12 was good for Black, why did Ishida not play it at once? The answer is that White would not play 2 in that diagram, but rather 2 in **Dia. 15.** By doing so he would let Black through on the upper side, but he would be more than sufficiently compensated by getting the vital point at 14, taking the pressure off of his center group and putting it onto Black's center group. He would also be threatening to attack the upper right corner at 'a'.

So Ishida played a second probe at Black 47. When Rin answered at 48 it became a good kikashi, reducing the upper side territory by several points. If Rin had tried to take Black 47 with 1 in **Dia. 16**, then Ishida would have cross-cut. The resulting sequence is complicated but inevitable. The aji of the three dead black stones in the upper left corner comes into play, and after Black 14 in Dia. 16 White seems to be getting the worst of it since Black is threatening to play 'b'. White can, however, manage as shown in **Dia. 17.** The outcome of this complicated fight is about fifty-fifty, so Rin could have started it. Probably he just did not want to get involved in this sort of thing so early in the game.

Black 49 in the figure occupied the vital point of Black 7 in Dia. 12 and White 14 in Dia. 15. By referring back to those two diagrams you can understand why Rin had to answer at 50, finally eliminating the bad aji on the upper side. He had now secured a large territory there, but Black 49 and 51 made his center stones pretty weak.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17





Figure 5 (52– 61)




Dia. 18

Figure 5 (52–61).


Rin did not defend his center stones directly but played 52 instead, a big play which revived the possibility of the nozoki at 'a'. Ishida was thinking in part to protect against White 'a' when he played 53, but he was also threatening to cut with 1 in **Dia. 18**. Rin had to defend with 54, and Ishida began to chase the white stones toward the right, attacking with keima.

Since Black's strategy was to form territory on the right it appears that he was chasing White in the wrong direction. Ishida was aware of this, and after the game he commented that Black 1 and 3 in **Dia. 19** might have been better. That diagram looks good on principle, but of course White has various ways to invade the black moyo, and we cannot tell what would have happened if Ishida had actually played this way.


With 59 and 61 Ishida began to build his territory. These plays look loose,



Dia. 19



Dia. 20



Dia. 21

but there was nothing to fear from White 1 in **Dia. 20**. Black 2 would keep White from penetrating into the right side, and the continuation in **Dia. 21** is a big failure for White.





Figure 6 (62– 70)


Figure 6 (62–70).

Rin played 62 and 64, threatening Dias. 20 and 21. He felt that he had to play 64 to keep Black from making a large territory with 'b', but Black 65 left him with less eye space in the center than before and he had to run for safety with 66–70.


In these running battles there is not much margin for error. If Rin had played White 66 one line to the right, as in **Dia. 22**, he would have had trouble making good shape. If Ishida had played 67 at 'c' to build a moyo on the lower side however, then White 67 would have given White too good a shape and threatened the right side. If Ishida had played 69 at 1 in **Dia. 23** he would have done poorly on the lower side. White could extend to 8 and his center group could not be killed. **Dia. 24** would be worse for Black because of the weak point at 'a'. The moves from 66 to 70 were the only course to follow, and here Ishida sealed his next play to end the first day.



Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 24






Figure 7 (71–85)



Dia. 25




Dia. 26

Figure 7 (71–85).


Ishida took his profit on the lower side with 71–79, but Rin played in both the upper and lower right hand corners with 80 and 82. This figure was relatively straightforward, but we have a lot to say about it anyway.

First let us investigate Black 71, the sealed move. Ishida had the good sense not to play 1 in **Dia. 25,** which would lead to a result similar to but even worse than diagrams 23 and 24, but what about 1 in **Dia. 26?** If Rin played 2, then Black 3–9 would follow just as in the figure and the lower right corner would be bigger and better defended than before. Ishida spoke about this possibility after the game, and Rin said that he would have played 2 in **Dia. 27**, risking a fight.


Rin could not take such a risk after Black 71 in the figure. If he had played 1 in **Dia. 28** Ishida would have played 2, threatening 'a', and 4. Black △ would now be in a good position for fighting on the lower side.



Dia. 27



Dia. 28




Dia. 29


After White 80 Ishida thought for 61 minutes. He wanted very much to close the lower right corner, but he was afraid of White 1 in **Dia. 29**, a tesuji enabling White to play 3 and 5 in sente. After 8 Black would have a small life in the corner but no profit on the right side. White could play kikashi at 'b' or atari at 'c', and considering this last point Black's whole shape in this area would become a rickety structure. Black 81 made the corner strong and prepared to take a large profit on the right side, as we shall see presently.

We now come to White 82 and the unconventional moves that followed it. The ordinary way to respond to a 3–3 point invasion such as this is with 1 in **Dia. 30**. In the present circumstances this would lead to ko. White had one good ko threat at 8 but little else, and Black would be able to capture the five stones in the upper left corner, making his center and left side groups safe for all time. White 12 would be big, but this exchange would be satisfactory for Black. After the game Ishida said that it was the correct way to play, but during the game he decided to try the unusual and played 83.


Rin thought of answering with 1 in **Dia. 31**. If Black played 2 there, he could live easily in the corner and have 'd' or 'e' to play later, but he was afraid of Black 2 etc. in **Dia. 32**. With White 9 he might just be able to live, but he could not be sure. White 84 was a safer move, and Ishida played a second keima at 85.



Dia. 30
⑩ takes ko



Dia. 31



Dia. 32






Figure 8 (86–101)



Dia. 33




Dia. 34


Figure 8 (86–101).

Ishida's two keima at 83 and 85 in the last figure may not have been correct plays, but they brought about a good result when Rin made a slip in this unfamiliar position. White 88 was his mistake, and due to it his corner was not definitely alive because Ishida could start a ko fight with 'd'. There were other things to do first, however. Ishida played Black 93, threatening to attack the center once more with Black 98. Rin defended with 94–98, but Ishida kept sente and had protected himself against White 'a' again. He played kikashi at 99, then made his big play at 101.


Returning to the lower right corner, let us point out how Rin should have played. Instead of White 88, 1 in **Dia. 33** was correct. The best Black could do would be to play 2 and 4, but now White's corner would be absolutely alive. If Black played 1 in **Dia. 34** instead of 4 in Dia. 33, White would be able to save himself with 2–10. If Black answered 1 with 2 in **Dia. 35** White would connect his corner to the center.




Dia. 35



Dia. 36



Dia. 37



Dia. 38

Rin could at any time alleviate the ko aji in the lower right corner by playing 1 and 3 in **Dia. 36** but these safety plays, sente though they be, cost White a lot. Now there is only a 1-play yose ko in the corner, as shown in **Dia. 37**, but Black 5 and, later, Black 'a' make a big difference in Black's territory on the lower side. It would be better for White to play 1 when he can challenge Black to a direct ko fight as shown in **Dia. 38**. A still better way is to play 1 at 3, as we shall see later in this game.






Figure 9 (102–112)
⑥ connects

Figure 9 (102–112).

Rin now had to find an answer to Black △, Ishida's last move. He began by playing kikashi with 2–10, and then made a good move at 12. He was unable to stop Black from taking a large territory on the right side, but White 12 threatened to cut off the Black center group and gave him enough ko threats to make Black 'd' out of the question.



Dia. 39



Dia. 40

Let us see what would have happened if Rin had answered Black ▲ by connecting. The sequence from 1 to 9 in **Dia. 39** is obvious, but now Black must be careful because White can push through at 'a'. Before playing 18 Black should play kikashi at 10–16. Then if White plays 'a' he has 'b', 'c', and so on and can easily live in the center. The purpose of 12–16 is to prevent a White tesuji at 'e', as explained in the next diagram.

Ishida had to be careful at the end of this figure, too. If he made his next move at 1 in **Dia. 40** White could play 2 and 4 in sente, then cut at 6. Black would no longer have a kikashi at 'c', and his center group could easily get into trouble.






Figure 10 (113–127)



Dia. 41
❸ tenuki



Dia. 42


Figure 10 (113–127).

After 13–18 White 'e' would no longer work, as the reader can surely see, and Ishida took his territory with 19. Rin took the largest yose point at 20, and after playing kikashi at 21 Ishida took the next largest point at 23.


Before playing 23 Ishida should have played another kikashi at 1 in **Dia. 41,** a fact of which he was soon aware. If after the activity in the lower left corner White got to play 4, Black would have good yose at 5 and 7. Compare this with **Dia. 4,** where White's upper side territory is three points larger and he can play 'a'.

Black 23 in the lower left corner is the standard play for occasions when the 3–3 point invasion is not good. If Black had played 1 in **Dia. 43** White would have made a kaketsugi at 6, cut with 8 and 10, then captured three black stones at 12. If Black does not play 13, a white stone there threatens both the corner and the left side.


Rin could not afford to give in with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 44**. Black 4 would make too much territory and later 'b' would be Black's sente. So he played 24 and 26 in the figure and Ishida played a tsuke at 27. Black 1, 3, and 5 in **Dia. 45** were also possible here, but Black 27 was a more spirited play.



Dia. 43



Dia. 44



Dia. 45

Figure 11 (128–153).

Rin played 28 in the lower left corner, ending in sente there and taking what was by far the biggest yose point at 34. Black 35 was the second largest. Notice Rin's good yose technique at 36. By playing this move he forced Ishida later to make two plays to capture the three dead white stones, as in **Dia. 46.** Compare this with **Dia. 47,** where White's territory is the same but Black's is two points larger. Rin could have played **Dia. 46** immediately, but he decided to save it for a while for possible use as ko material, a fateful decision as it turned out.

White 40 and Black 41 were the next largest of the yose points. The latter prevented White 1 in **Dia. 48,** a play which would both enlarge White's corner territory and reduce Black's lower side. If Black plays 2 in Dia. 48 then White can later jump out to 'a', or if Black plays 'b' White can play 2 and capture a stone.







Figure 11 (128–153)



Dia. 46




Dia. 47




Dia. 48


White 40 prevented Black 1 in **Dia. 49.** Considering that Black could later play 'x' in Dia. 49 in sente, the yose there was worth 12 points. Dia. 48 looks slightly bigger, but Rin had a second aim in playing White 40, namely the cut at White 48. Black 49 was now a necessary sacrifice, for if Ishida played 1 in **Dia. 50** Rin would play warikomi at 2. After White 4 Ishida would have to play 5 in the center to save his stones there and Rin could then win the game with 6 and 8. In **Dia. 51** however, due to the presence of △ Black can capture the white intruders. This is not too difficult a semeai and we leave the reader to work on it himself if he is interested. The game was close.



Dia. 49



Dia. 50
❺ tenuki



Dia. 51

Figure 12 (154–168).

Before connecting at 58 to cut off the black center group Rin played kikashi at 54 and 56. If he had connected directly at 1 in **Dia. 52** Ishida could have lived with a fair amount of territory by playing 2–8, after which White could of course not play 'a'. The rest of this figure was straightforward.





Figure 12 (154–168)
㊻ takes ko




Dia. 52


Figure 13 (169–179).

The game was decided in this figure. The yose in the center was hard to figure out and both players made mistakes, but Rin made the last mistake and ended in gote. Ishida played gyaku yose at 79 and at last the fortunes of this game began to shine clearly upon him. Besides stealing points from White on the edge of the board around the corner, Black 79 made 'f' a sente yose point.

The first mistake in this figure was Black 69. The correct way for Black to live in the center was with 1 and 3 in **Dia. 53**. The yose could continue as shown, with White making a six-point hane-tsugi at 8 and 10. Next Black would have the big yose sequence shown in **Dia. 54** which would save Black △ and keep 'a' from being White's sente. If White played 7 instead of 2, (or instead of 8 in Dia. 53), Black would get his profit on the left side instead of in the center. Had Black played correctly here, the game would have been close and still undecided.


The second mistake was White 74 in the figure. Rin should simply have played 1 in **Dia. 55**. Black would have to live in gote with 2 and 4, and White would get three good yose points at 5, 7, and 9. White 7 enlarges the upper side by 3 points, considering that 'b' is White's sente. Does the reader see how the center group can be killed if Black 4 is omitted? White would now lead by $\frac{1}{2}$—$1\frac{1}{2}$ points.






Dia. 53

Figure 13 (169–179)



Dia. 54



Dia. 55

Figure 14 (180–200).

Rin had another yose play in the center, which he took at 80, reducing Black's territory there to the minimum three points. White 80, however, enlarged White's territory by only one point. Rin would have preferred to capture at 1 in **Dia. 56**, but that play would have been gote for him. After White 3 Black can tenuki and and the center is alive. **Dia. 57** is also gote for White, because Black is threatening to play 'a'.







Figure 14 (180–200)



Dia. 56



Dia. 57



Dia. 58

After Black 89 Rin had to return to the big gyaku yose point at 90, and so Ishida got to play gyaku yose again at 97. White 200 was yet another gyaku yose point. If White 2 in **Dia. 58** is omitted then Black can take this point, forcing White to play 'a', and capture △ in ko, releasing his stones on the lower edge from damezumari. Considering the size of Black 3 and 5, Rin could not allow Ishida to play Black 1.





Figure 15 (201–220)



Dia. 59

Figure 15 (201–220).

Ishida pushed into the center and Rin had no better answer than 2 and 4. Ishida took one of the two remaining large yose points at 5 and, after some sente yose plays in the center, Rin took the other at 18. If Rin had played White 1 in **Dia. 59** instead of 4 in the figure he would have gotten the same net profit as in the actual game. Black 6 in Dia. 59 could be played at 7, again with the same net result.

Among White's plays in this figure 8 and 10 lessened Black's lead by one point. Ishida should have played at 10 himself before playing Black 5. White 10 enlarged White's center territory by two points and although it provoked Black 11, this cost White only one point on the left edge. In spite of this little slip the game was in Black's hands, now by a margin of exactly half a point.





Figure 16 (221–241)

Figure 16 (221–241).

Rin had a chance to complicate the game by starting a ko fight in the lower left corner after Black 23 or 27, but he acquiesced by playing 26 and 28. He had to answer Black 29, 31, and 33 and the game ended without a fuss. The final count was:

White		Black	
Upper side	43	Right and lower sides	67
Center	18	Center	3
Lower left	4	Left side	4
Lower right	4		74
	69		

Suppose that Rin had played 1 in **Dia. 60** instead of 28 in the figure. He had ko threats at 'a-f' and could have put up a fight, but Ishida would use 'g', 'h', and 'i' as ko threats and have 'j-p' left besides. In the end he might play 'q' as a ko threat, letting Rin connect in the lower left corner, then win the ko at 'r'. White would have gained three points in the lower left corner, but he would have lost points at 6, 'q', and 'r' and the result would still be a half point victory for Black. Against an amateur White would try Dia. 60 anyway, hoping for a godsend, but Rin knew that he was dealing with the next Honinbo and did not waste his time.



Dia. 60 ❽takes ko

It was around 11 o'clock when this game ended. Rin and Ishida faced each other across the go board.

"Half a point?" said Rin.

"Half a point to the good," replied Ishida.

"Let's count it," said Rin, and they verified the result by arranging the territories on the board. The Honinbo Sen was over.

Rin Kai Ho was now just a 9-dan professional with no title to his name. He remained in this status for only three and a half months, however, for in October he defeated Fujisawa and became Meijin again.

Ishida was now the hero of the go world, and especially of the Kitani Dojo. Three times had Kitani Minoru challenged for the Honinbo title, and three times had he been beaten.What the master had failed to accomplish, his star pupil had done. The go world began to buzz with talk of the new, twenty-two year old Honinbo. He would replace Rin as strongest player, he would become twenty dan, etc., etc., etc.

Four days after the end of the Honinbo Sen Ishida played the fifth and last game of the Best Ten title match. He had lost the last two games of that series through careless mistakes, but he declared that he would win the deciding game without fail and he quite overwhelmed Kajiwara, capturing a big group of his stones and forcing him to resign in just 141 moves. Ishida now held three of the major go titles; Honinbo, Best of Ten, and Nihon Kiin Championship.

The stress of playing two big title matches told on him, however, for he went into decline during July and August. His thirty game winning streak in Oteai ended abruptly with three straight losses, and he lost games in the Kodansha, Judan, and NHK-TV tournaments as well. He was back in form in September, however, and is now playing in the Meijin League. Rin is playing in the Honinbo League of course, and the coming year may produce a rematch or two between these young players.

Time elapsed: White: 9 hrs. 59 min.
Black: 9 hrs. 58 min.

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